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Abstract 
This thesis examines why sentencing disparity between partisan elected and non-partisan 
elected judiciaries exists. I contend that partisan elected judiciaries produce harsher sentences. 
The theoretical reasoning provided, is that political parties converge to the mean on politically 
popular issues, in this case a perceived “toughness on crime”. Therefore party affiliation and 
party primary selection causes judicial officers to conform their sentencing practices to party 
demands in order to gain selection, election and retention. I conducted a quantitative analysis of 
the conviction and imprisonment data from circuit courts in geographically and demographically 
similar counties of Illinois (partisan election) and Michigan (non-partisan election) to test this 
theory. In my case study this severity of sentence is measured by the number of criminal 
convictions that result in imprisonment. The partisan elected judiciary produced significantly 
higher rates of imprisonment, suggesting that party affiliation is a contributing factor to 
sentencing disparity between judicial selection systems.  
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Introduction 
 
From the 15th century, the sculpture of Lady Justice is often depicted wearing a blindfold. 
The blindfold represents objectivity, suggesting justice should be provided dispassionately, 
without fear or favour, without regard for identity, power, money, or weakness; blind justice is 
independent and impartial. It is for these very reasons that any form of sentencing disparity must 
be called into question, and reasoning must be investigated. Understanding behavioural 
motivations of the judiciary is important because an individual judge has a large amount of 
power over the individual, as stated by Matthew Streb in his 2007 publication,  
“While a member of Congress is just one of 535, a judge may be one of a few people- 
and, indeed, may often be the sole person- responsible for a decision. Even in cases 
where a jury is ultimately responsible for a verdict, the judge has great discretion in 
terms of ruling on the procedural aspects of the case, and, in many states it is the judge 
who is responsible for the sentencing.” 1 
Although a Judge is an individual, the judiciary is a normative system operating under 
sentencing guidelines and thus, why should significant sentencing differences exist between 
states in the United States? It is this question that I seek to address in my study. By examining 
the geographically and demographically similar states of Illinois and Michigan that use different 
judicial electoral processes, Illinois partisan and Michigan non-partisan, I have been able to 
eliminate other variables and look at how judicial party affiliation and partisan labelling affects 
sentencing. By collating data on Illinois and Michigan county circuit court case dispositions, 
conviction rates and imprisonment rates I have conducted a quantitative analysis to try to 
determine whether partisan elected judiciaries have significantly higher sentencing than non-
partisan elected judiciaries.  
                                                          
1
 Streb, M. (2007). “Running for Judge : The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections”. New York 
University Press. Ch 1. Pp3 
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In the first chapter of my study I review the current literature of judicial elections. Within 
this review I look at the current strands of theory on this subject, partisan effect, election effect 
and judicial integrity. I also reflect upon gaps in the research and position my own research 
within the literature. The literature review will be followed by my examination of the history of 
judicial elections in the United States and current affairs and developments in this area. Both 
Illinois and Michigan started from a British style appointment system however differing waves 
of popular reform swept these states and ultimately led to differing forms of judicial selection. 
Many legal scholars, former justices, Bar Associations and justice advocates are currently 
campaigning for further judicial reforms in relation to fund raising and selection process.  
In the second chapter I use the literature review, and history and current developments to 
help construct my own theoretical framework in relation to this case study; sentencing 
differences between partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries. My primary argument being 
that partisan labelling and party affiliation is the main cause of sentencing disparity between the 
two states. Furthermore I discuss partisan electoral policy, the argument for the middle ground- a 
perception of toughness on crime desired from both parties, and how this results in more sever 
sentences. The nature of partisan elections will also be examined, particularly fund raising and 
how this could affect judicial independence and integrity. I will further discuss the possibility of 
partisan differences within states of partisan elected judiciaries and the possible effect of 
elections on sentencing in both states.  
In the second part of the chapter two I will outline the methodology of my study, looking at 
how and why the particular counties were selected. I then discuss how I will control external 
causal factors such as racial, geographic and other demographics including median income, high 
school completion and university attainment. Following this I outline my hypothesis, that 
partisan elected judiciaries produce higher sentences than non-partisan elected judiciaries, and I 
discuss the dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of 
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people entering the prison system, whilst the independent variable is the type of judicial selection 
which determines the number of people entering the prison system.  
The third chapter commences with my results, the first being the collation of Illinois and 
Michigan county conviction and imprisonment rates and I test for significant difference in both 
conviction and imprisonment rates. These results do not produce significant differences between 
the two states for conviction rates, however they do for imprisonment rates [p-value < 0.05, p = 
0.00 (2008), p = 0.00 (2009), p = 0.03 (2010)]. These results conclude that the selected Illinois 
counties have significantly higher imprisonment rates than Michigan. I then test for the impact of 
any external causal factors by testing the conviction and imprisonment rates of Illinois and 
Michigan counties with 10% or greater black population, less than 80% white population against 
their respective state data. This returned only one set of significant differences, that of the Illinois 
counties with 10% or greater black population. These counties had significantly higher 
imprisonment rates than their state data [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.00 (2008), p = 0.01 (2009) and p = 
0.01 (2010)]. The geographical groupings, metropolitan, regional and rural for Illinois and 
Michigan also returned no significant difference from their respective total state data. The 
comparison of similar counties to their interstate counterparts further validated my hypothesis. 
Finally I tested the within state difference between the groupings of republican and democrat 
dominated judicial circuits. This produced no significant difference in conviction and 
imprisonment rates between the two parties.  
Chapter three concludes with my discussion of the results, whereupon I reflect on how they 
are suggestive of evidence for my theory. Firstly I examine the validation of my hypothesis 
within the bounds of my study and just how partisan affiliation and labelling affects sentencing. 
In this case the party processes involved in candidate selection place expectations and 
obligations on the future judicial officers. The significantly higher imprisonment rates in the 
Illinois counties with 10% or greater black population are then looked at in context of this study. 
10 
 
Given that Illinois and Michigan have a similar black population percentage, this external causal 
factor is ruled out. I then look at the geographical and county comparison results making note of 
outlying data and trends. The significant trend being the generally higher conviction rates in 
Michigan, yet the (significantly) higher imprisonment rate in Illinois and the larger standard 
deviations in imprisonment rates in Illinois. This leads me to conclude that Michigan and 
perhaps non-partisan elected judiciaries generally produce more uniform imprisonment rates. 
Following this I examine the results from the partisan tests; although not significant the data 
shows that conviction rates and imprisonment rates tend to be higher in republican dominated 
judiciaries. In order to test my theory of the effect of competition upon sentencing I compare the 
results from the bipartisan county in my selection to the state averages. I look at the election year 
effect in relation to results. As I did not find an election year effect in my results I can dismiss it 
in relation to my study. I examine how the results and findings of my study may be generalized 
to other counties and states with similar electoral structures and finally I look at what the results 
mean to the field of judicial election scholarship and reform. 
Chapter four commences with an examination of the limitations of my study and highlight 
areas of inquiry that my results suggest require further research. Firstly I look at the limited 
scope of this study and how that may limit inference of my results upon the wider judicial 
structure. Secondly I reflect on how further study and collation of data from more counties is 
required before my theory can be further validated.  Finally I provide a conclusion to my study 
and reflect on what this study gives to the field of judicial selection scholarship.  
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Chapter 1: History, Scholarship and 
Developments of Judicial Elections 
Literature Review 
 
By reviewing the literature on United States judicial elections I was able to distinguish the 
area of scholarship requiring more investigation and review to provide a more expansive 
discourse on this topic. By focusing my research on sentencing differences it revealed that there 
is a lack of comparative analysis between sentencing in partisan judicially elected states and non-
partisan judicially elected states. In eight states judges are elected via partisan election, whilst in 
fifteen states judges are elected via non-partisan election and the remaining states select judges 
via an appointment system. As reviewed in this section, scholarship is available in regards to 
election versus selection of judiciary, however there is not literature looking at how type of 
election may affect sentencing. It is important to conduct a comparative quantitative analysis of 
sentencing differences between partisan and non-partisan states, as the debate on which method 
of judicial selection results in a more autonomous and consistent judiciary, is still far from 
settled.
2
 
My review will be divided into three areas, similar to the debate in the scholarship of 
judicial elections. The first being the partisan effect on sentencing, this area being most relevant 
to my research. The second being the alternative explanation to sentencing differences, that of 
the election effect, and finally the question of integrity. The final part of my review is really at 
the heart of much of the scholarship undertaken in this field; can the judiciary remain 
independent if it is elected, what are the positives and negatives of the process and where do we 
go from here? 
                                                          
2
 Rottman, D. B., and Schotland, R. A. (2005). Symposium: Aftermath of the 2004 Judicial Elections. Spectrum: Winter,78: 17-19 
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The Partisan Effect on Sentencing 
One of the major points of debate in the discourse on judicial behaviour and sentencing 
practices is that of the Partisan effect on sentencing, perceived judicial quality and independence 
of the judiciary.
3
 As Sobel and Hall (2007)state partisan elections are the primary reason for 
lower judicial quality, and this lowering of judicial quality and independence is caused by the 
very nature of partisan election- where money spent on electoral donations, particularly from 
corporations, industry, single-interest groups and individuals certainly questions judicial 
independence and integrity.
4
  Very early scholarship in this field discussed sentencing 
differences due to personal and ideological differences, ideological differences that fell along 
party lines.
5
  
It has been found that there are significant sentencing differences between Republican and 
Democrat judges which follow ideological lines, e.g. Republican- more conservative being tough 
on street crime and softer on environmental or white-collar crime and the converse found in 
Democrat- liberal.
6
  There are Sentencing Guidelines for each state and federal judiciary that 
prescribes sentences for types of crimes, dependent on circumstance; there is still the opportunity 
for a judge to use discretion in sentencing. 
7
 Schanzenbach and Tiller’s (2007) research focused 
                                                          
3 Sobel, R. S. And Hall, J. C. (2007). The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics. 
Cato Journal; Winter, 27: 69-82. 
Schanzenbach, M., and Tiller, E. H. (2007). Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political 
Theory and Evidence.  Journal of Law Economics and Organization: 23 no. 1: 24-56 
4 Rottman, D. B., and Schotland, R. A. (2005). Symposium: Aftermath of the 2004 Judicial Elections. Spectrum: Winter,78: 17-19 
Streb, M. (2007). “Running for Judge : The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections”. New York University 
Press. Ch 1. Pp3 
5 Everson, G. (1919). The Human Element of Justice. J. Criminal Law & Criminology,vol. 10, pp  90. 
Haines, C. G. (1922). General Observations on the Effects of Personal Politics and Economic Influences in the Decisions of 
Judges. 17 Ill. Law Review. 96, pp 105. 
6 Schanzenbach, M., and Tiller, E. H. (2007). Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political 
Theory and Evidence.  Journal of Law Economics and Organization: 23 no. 1: 24-56 
7
 The Federal Sentencing Guideline 2010, accessed on 18/3/2012 via 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/ToC_PDF.cfm 
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on “fact-based adjustments” and “law-based departures”. Fact-based adjustments are where a 
judge would move upwards or downwards on the sentencing scale dependent on facts of the 
crime (severity, personal history of perpetrator, details of victim, remorse, likelihood of re-
offending, etc.). Law-based departures from the sentencing guidelines occur when a judge 
determines the circumstances of the crime do not fit previous sentences, creating new legal 
precedent. Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) find significant levels of fact-based adjustment - 
manipulation of “The Sentencing Guidelines” to determine final offence level, to serve party 
ideology. However there were no significant findings for upwards law-based departures, this 
they argue is because the sentence would be an appealed and highly ideological judicial 
sentencing, and would be upheld. Finally they state that “The Sentencing Guidelines” and 
Appellate courts have certainly curbed ideological sentencing practices in District courts, but yet 
they still exist. 
There has been evidence found to the contrary to the above findings of Schanzenbach and 
Tiller (2007), contesting that there is actually no difference in sentencing between Democrat and 
Republican judges and thus no partisan effect. 
8
 Due to the random assignment of cases, 
Ashenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab (1995) claim that the structure of the court system results in 
no significant sentencing differences between conservatives and liberals. However the judges 
Ashenfelter et al., (1995) used for their study were appointed judges, via Republican or 
Democrat administrations, and so it could be argued that their findings were because judges were 
not answerable to their electorate or campaign donors who had expected certain outcomes based 
on party ideology. Sobel and Hall (2007) argue that although the distribution of democrat and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8 Ashenfelter, O., Eisenberg, T. ,and Schwab, S. J. (1995). Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
outcomes. Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 24: 257-281 
Bright, S. B., and Keenan, P. J. (1995). Judges and the Politic of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the next Election 
in Capital Cases. Boston University Law Review, vol. 73: 759 
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republican judges across states is relatively even, averaging out the markedly different outcomes, 
it does not overcome the fact that significantly different sentences do exist. The above finding is 
one that I will be addressing in my research – do sentencing differences between Democrat and 
Republican judges within a partisan state average out? If this theory is correct partisan state 
sentencing will not be significantly different from non-partisan states, however the within state 
differences will be significant.  
What is notably absent from the discourse on the effect of partisan judicial elections is that 
of a comparative analysis to non-partisan judicial elections, which is what my study is designed 
to address. If it is found that sentencing is more consistent in non-partisan states surely that 
would indicate a lack of integrity, independence and consistency in the judiciary in partisan 
states. From the role of partisanship upon the judiciary we now focus on the nature of elections 
themselves. 
The Election Effect 
The alternative to the theory of partisanship causing sentencing differences is the effect 
judicial elections themselves have in sentencing differences, whereby judges’ behaviour is 
governed by public opinion. Politicians on both sides of the aisle don’t want to be considered 
“soft on crime” and nor do judges. Mark Warr, 1995, states “As a public issue crime is capable 
of generating levels of public passion” (p 296). 9 The effect this social opinion has on sentencing 
has been looked at extensively in relation to capital punishment, and general criminal cases. 
10
 
                                                          
9 Warr, M. (1995). Poll Trends: Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment. The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol 59, No. 2: 296-310.  
10
 Bright, S. B., and Keenan, P. J. (1995). Judges and the Politic of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the 
next Election in Capital Cases. Boston University Law Review, vol. 73: 759 
 
Brooks, R. R. W. And Raphael, S. (2002). Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship between Judicial Elections and 
Capital Punishment. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; Spring: 609 
 
Gordon, S. C., and Huber, G. A. (2007). The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behaviour.  Quarterley Journal of 
Policitical Science: 2 no.2: 107-138 
 
Huber, G.  A., and Gordon, S. C. (2004). Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?  American Journal of 
Political Science 48, (2): 247-263 
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The crux of this theory of sentencing differences is that in an election year in order to appear 
‘tough on crime’ and be re-elected or promoted sentences are significantly more severe. It is the 
act of elections not partisan politics that result in sentencing differences between judges, 
especially those not running for election.  This modification in behaviour, reflected through 
sentencing discrepancy is not a newly discovered phenomenon but was noted in the findings of 
Gaudet in (1933). He concluded that imminent re-election impacted upon sentencing terms.
11
 
 
Bright and Keenan (1995), and Brooks and Raphael (2002) both come to the conclusion 
that during the election year of a sitting judge those found guilty of murder were significantly 
more likely to receive the death penalty. Brooks and Raphael (2002) state that in instances where 
the jury reached a verdict and sentence, there is often the opportunity for judges to instruct the 
jury, in some instances encouraging them to apply the death penalty- with judges in some 
instances overruling the jury in sentencing and applying the death penalty. It seems also that this 
trend in significantly harsher punishment during an election year is not limited to the turn of last 
century, as in Brooks and Raphael’s (2002) study, but as Bright and Keenan (1995) conclude it is 
still occurring. Judges have the ability, provided it is within sentencing guidelines or legal 
doctrine to “Tailor punishment to socially desirable outcomes” (p 612). 12 Bright and Keenan 
(1995) discuss how an unpopular decision may cost a judge their seat on the bench or future 
promotion. This happens even when the judge has come to a not guilty verdict or lenient 
sentence due to technical legal doctrine. Bright and Keenan put forward the notion that judges 
are often elected by populist decision and not legal reason, because much of the electorate do not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ross, T. M. (1988). Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on Judges’Ability to Protect Criminal 
Defendants’Rights. 7 Law and Inequality 111: 127. 
 
11 Gaudet, F. J. (1933). “Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges”. Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology; 23, pp 811 
12
 Bright, S. B., and Keenan, P. J. (1995). Judges and the Politic of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the 
next Election in Capital Cases. Boston University Law Review, vol. 73: 759 
16 
 
understand technical legal proceedings. I will elaborate on this issue when discussing the third 
area of scholarship. 
Ross (1988) states the election of the judiciary sees judges modify their behaviour to 
comply with public desires. Judges are not offered the facility out of court to discuss their 
decisions and often these decisions are reached through legal doctrine, which is not understood 
by the lay person. Posner’s (1993) paper’s focus is primarily on this fact, modification of 
behaviour due to economic rational choice, sentencing designed to further ones career, or to keep 
ones job.
13
 Huber and Gordon (2004) state “voters are largely uninformed about judicial 
behaviour so even the outcome of a single publicized case can be decisive in their evaluations” 
(p 247)
14
 highlighting just how one sentencing can damage a career, even if it is considered 
legally correct. 
Throughout this particular theme of judicial election scholarship there is consensus that the 
significantly harsher sentences are not reserved to judges of a particular political party and 
ideology but are seen across the spectrum in an election year. The point is also made that this 
thirst for harsh and hasty sentences applies to politicians also and political pressure upon the 
judiciary can be witnessed, calling into question the independence of the bench.
15
 Gordon and 
Huber (2004)(2007) also make reference to the fact that judges may discount a preferred 
                                                          
13 Posner, R. A. (1993). What do Judges Maximise? (The same thing everybody else does). John M. Olin Law and Economics 
Working Paper No.15, 2
nd
 series: 1-26 
14
 Huber, G.  A., and Gordon, S. C. (2004). Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?  American Journal 
of Political Science 48, (2): 247-263.  
 
15 Kubik, J. D. And Moran, J. R. (2001). Lethal Elections: Gubnatorial Politics and the Timing of Executions. Centre for Policy 
Research, Syracuse University, Working Paper. 
Bright, S. B., and Keenan, P. J. (1995). Judges and the Politic of Death: Deciding between the Bill of Rights and the 
next Election in Capital Cases. Boston University Law Review, vol. 73: 759 
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sentence for a more socially desired one to retain office, reiterating Posner’s (1993) argument 
that judges are not immune to economic rational choice modelling.
16
  
However there has also been an argument that when there is an absence of serious 
challengers to an incumbent there may be the witnessing of an “erosion of democratic 
accountability” (p108)17, where judges can do as they wish or it is the case that the judge is 
compliant to community or constituent demands and thus not autonomous.
18
 It is also seen in 
election results, in incumbent defeat, that judges are held accountable for factors outside their 
control e.g. incumbent judges lose their seat when state crime rates go up, and thus it is 
understandable they would do what it takes to retain office.
19
 Although this stream is not directly 
related to my line of research, as it does not examine partisan versus non-partisan sentencing 
differences, it does however build upon my reasoning in explaining sentencing discrepancies’. 
My theoretical framework is based on the notion that judges adjust sentencing in order to comply 
with party desires to retain office and therefore power. In regards to justice this sees parties 
revert to the perceived median voter desire “tough on crime”.  
 
Question of Integrity 
In my own research I am not looking at merit-based appointment sentencing and whether it 
is significantly different, however it is important to understand the debate as to why judges are 
elected at all and where my research will contribute to this scholarship. 
                                                          
16 Posner, R. A. (1993). What do Judges Maximise? (The same thing everybody else does). John M. Olin Law and Economics 
Working Paper No.15, 2
nd
 series: 1-26 
17
 Gordon, S. C., and Huber, G. A. (2007). The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behaviour.  
Quarterley Journal of Policitical Science: 2 no.2: 107-138 
18 Streb, M.  J., and Frederick, B. (2009). Conditions for competition in low-information judicial elections: The case of 
intermediate appellate court elections. Political Research Quarterly 62: 523-537 
19
 Huber, G.  A., and Gordon, S. C. (2004). Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?  American Journal 
of Political Science 48, (2): 247-263 
18 
 
Given the nature of the office many non-American citizens find it hard to understand why 
judges are elected. In Sobel and Hall’s (2007) paper they discuss that the very nature of 
campaigning impinges judicial integrity. Polls conducted by Geyh (2003) in the states of Texas 
and Ohio suggest that 80% of citizens believe that campaign contributions would have a 
significant influence on subsequent judgements. 
20
 As the above results show, citizens still cling 
to their right to vote, their right to hold an officer to account, in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that the process of election creates integrity issues, e.g. in South Dakota appointment of 
judges via merit-based legislative selection passed through the legislature unanimously, but was 
rejected by 62% of voters. 
21
 
The degradation of judicial integrity, independence and impartiality can also be witnessed 
when judges campaign, advertising their credentials for being pro-business or pro-labour.
27
  A 
further example of this behaviour was seen during the 2004 Ohio judicial elections (non-
partisan) where a candidate for the Supreme Court announced his views on disputed legal cases, 
revealing where he would stand on controversial issues and his party affiliation.
22
 To respond to 
the negative effects of judicial elections Streb and Frederick (2009) point out that by holding 
judicial elections there is public accountability and indeed facility to participate in an otherwise 
closed section of governance.
23
 It has also been noted that contested elections should lead to 
better candidates.
24
 
                                                          
20 Geyh, C. G. (2003). Judicial independence, judicial accountability, and the role of constitutional norms in congressional 
regulation of the courts. Indiana Law Journal: 78, no.1: 153-221 
21
 Sobel, R. S., and Hall, J. C. (2007). The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics. 
Cato Journal; Winter, 27: 69-82. 
22 Rottman, D. B., and Schotland, R. A. (2005). Symposium: Aftermath of the 2004 Judicial Elections. Spectrum: Winter,78: 17-19 
23 Streb, M.  J., and Frederick, B. (2009). Conditions for competition in low-information judicial elections: The case of 
intermediate appellate court elections. Political Research Quarterly 62: 523-537 
24
 Huber, G.  A., and Gordon, S. C. (2004). Accountability and coercion: Is justice blind when it runs for office?  American Journal 
of Political Science 48, (2): 247-263 
19 
 
Yet in contrast to these concepts one of the original scholars in judicial theory, Pound 
(1963), claimed that the placement of the judiciary into the political sphere in many jurisdictions 
has diminished the integrity of the bench. 
25
 Pound’s (1963) arguement was witnessed in both the 
2000 and 2004 elections when private interest groups spent millions on judicial campaigns, 
either through donation or advertising. As Rottman and Schotland (2005) stated these actions 
have lead to a decrease in integrity. 
26
 Tabbarrok and Helland (1999) find significant differences 
in the awarding of tort awards to in-state plaintiffs (constituents) to the detriment of out-of-state 
businesses, further highlighting the questionable independence of an elected judiciary.
27
 Yet, as 
seen with the referendum results, there is still reluctance by the United States public to give up 
the right to elect their judges. 
28 
  
It has been exhibited in much of the previous research and examined in this paper, whether 
it is partisan factors or popular factors, when there are significant sentencing differences 
continually occurring, the question remains, is the judiciary independent? It is this question that 
fuels further research. 
Conclusion 
In closing I will briefly outline where my research fits into the spectrum of scholarship 
upon judicial elections and sentencing differences, what current problem it is addressing and 
why it is important to the discourse.  My research will fit into the current partisan effect 
paradigm where there is currently an absence of scholarship comparing the sentence lengths in 
partisan judicially elected states to those in non-partisan judicially elected states. I hope the 
results will address the current problem in determining which form of judicial electoral system is 
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more consistent and independent. This will then allow me to make recommendations for reform 
and guidelines to improve the current structure. 
 
Then and Now: History and Reform 
Developments  
In the following I section I will look at the history surrounding judicial selection in the 
United States broadly and then focus upon the history of the Illinois and Michigan judicial 
selection systems and their current form. Following this I will look at unsuccessful reforms in 
both states and current criticisms of the differing forms of judicial election process.     
History 
In order to account for the any significant differences in sentencing that occur between 
partisan and non-partisan judicially elected states I will examine when and how these processes 
came about in order to isolate causal effects. Federal Judicial selection is straight forward, as it is 
laid out in the constitution, the President is to nominate all federal judicial candidates and then 
they must be confirmed by the senate. However the selection process in the states is wide 
ranging due to federalism. Broadly, there are two types of judicial selection being practiced in 
the United States, election or appointment.  
Originally the judges in all thirteen of the first states were appointed in a similar system to 
England. However, since independence there has been an ongoing debate about the process of 
selection. Jefferson originally led the debate, proclaiming that in the English system judges were 
only accountable to King George rather than the people and this should not be the case in this 
great experiment of democracy, the United States. Accordingly it was argued that the United 
21 
 
States should have a democratic system where judges are accountable to the people.
29
 In 1832 
Mississippi became the first state to amend its constitution to allow for the election of judges. By 
the Civil War 24 of the 34 states had judicial elections and subsequently every state that joined 
the Union, until Alaska’s 1959 admission, has the election of some of its judges, particularly the 
circuit court or trial court judges. The Jacksonian era saw an expansion in suffrage and popular 
control of elected officials. It was felt that this measure would result in an increased sense of 
responsibility on behalf of elected officials to their communities.
30
 It was also believed that by 
standing from a party platform communities would have a better idea of the judicial candidates’ 
values. Thus the first judicial elections were partisan and subsequently dominated by the early 
machine politics, leading to cronyism and corruption. 
31
 
32
 Thus partisan judicial elections 
exacerbated the problem they were implemented to improve.  
Early Reform 
As touched upon in the literature review early scholars, members of the American Bar 
Association and progressives prompted a push for judicial selection reform. One of the leading 
reforms was non-partisan elections. This reform was popular as it was designed to reduce the 
influence of divisive national partisan issues on local elections. Further to this it was hoped it 
would lessen the control of the large city political machines over the nomination process. This 
reform was seen as a way to keep judges “above politics” whilst remaining accountable to the 
people. Judges first ran in non-partisan elections in Cook County, Illinois, in 1873, following this 
12 states used non-partisan judicial elections as their method of judicial selection by 1927.
29
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However non-partisan elections were not without their problems and critics. As judges still 
had to campaign for election and re-election, political parties were still involved as their 
involvement had not yet been reformed. The second major concern was that the quality of 
justices would suffer if the partisan cue was not supplied to voters. It was believed that the 
partisan cue would inform voters, in the most basic way, as to whether a judicial candidate 
shared their ‘values’.   
Illinois and Michigan  
Illinois and Michigan have been chosen for this case study as they have differing methods 
of judicial election, Illinois being partisan judicial election and Michigan non-partisan judicial 
election at the circuit court level. Furthermore in order to isolate causal effects of sentencing 
disparity these states were chosen because of their demographic and geographic similarity. From 
1818 to 1848 Illinois’ judiciary was elected for life by the general assembly. An amendment in 
1848 saw partisan elections introduced, with Supreme Court justices to serve 9 year terms and 
Circuit Court judges to serve 6 year terms. During the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 several 
counties opted for non-partisan elections but the Constitution of 1964 saw the unification of 
counties and courts to a partisan method of judicial election. Although Cook County may have 
been the first to embrace non-partisan judicial elections it was also one of the first to discard 
them, by 1927 Cook County moved back to partisan judicial elections. There were however still 
efforts to reform the judicial electoral system. In 1962 voters ratified the implementation of 
retention elections (where a judicial officer runs unopposed and must receive over 65% of the 
‘yes’ vote), rather than re-election. This push for reform was similar to the wave of support for 
non-partisan elections, as it combined the concept of judicial independence (do not have to run 
against opponent) and judicial accountability (face the possibility of loss of office if their 
constituents are not happy with their performance).
33
 The Judicial Amendment in 1964 of the 
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Illinois constitution states that judicial officials shall be nominated by party convention or 
primary and then elected at general election. Section 11 states judges can opt to retain office via 
retention election.
34
  
 
Michigan, like all other states in the early 19
th
 century did not have an elected judiciary but 
rather from 1836 to 1850 judges were appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the senate. 
Reforms of 1850 saw judges elected by the people in partisan elections with the Supreme Court 
justices serving 8 year terms and Circuit Court judges six year terms. In 1939 a constitutional 
amendment was passed in Michigan which saw the legislating of non-partisan judicial elections 
for circuit courts, this was formalised in the Michigan Constitution in 1964.
 35
 After their 6 year 
term circuit court Judges in Michigan have to run for re-election, not a retention election as in 
Illinois.  
Having examined both the history of the changing judicial selection in both Illinois and 
Michigan the following conclusions can be reached. The different methods of judicial selection 
were not put into place to amend sentencing problems or high crime rates but to resolve 
criticism. A correlation can be seen with popular reform sentiment of the times. 
Changes and Attempts to Change 
Since the mid-twentieth century there have been no major changes to either the Illinois 
partisan judicial elections or the Michigan non-partisan judicial elections. This however does not 
mean the critics or the criticism of judicial elections has ceased. It must be noted that there has 
been far more activity on reform of the judicial process in Illinois than in Michigan, as presented 
below. 
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There has only been one successful reform on judicial selection in Michigan. This reform 
was the constitutional amendment of 1996 that requires judicial candidates to have practiced law 
for at least 5 years.  Since 2000 there have been no amendments proposed. Illinois on the other 
hand has had 2 successful reforms but has also had far more failed reforms. In 1992 the 
legislature established the Cook County sub-circuit to promote more diversity on the bench. 
Secondly in 2009 SB 1466 was passed in which limits were imposed on judicial campaign 
contributions, $125 000 in the 1
st
 judicial district and $75 000 in the other judicial districts. 
Campaign finance, which will be discussed further below, has remained a “hot” topic 
surrounding judicial elections. In the 1970 Constitutional Convention a proposal was put forward 
regarding judicial selection, proposing partisan elections or merit selection. The merit selection 
proposal carried in many counties including Cook but was defeated state-wide by 146 000 votes. 
In 1973 a similar push for judicial merit selection on the floor of the state congress failed. In 
1988 after several judicial corruption scandals Governor Thompson appointed a taskforce to 
reform the selection process, however none of the proposals put forward ever made it through 
the congressional committee. Finally in 1996 a bill proposing Gubernatorial appointment with 
senate confirmation for Supreme Court judges and merit selection for Cook County Circuit 
judges, and merit selection for all circuit court and appellate court judges, was defeated on the 
senate floor. Also in that year a requirement that circuit court judges be at least 35 years of age 
and have 10 years legal experience failed in the house.
36
 
Recent incidences in both Michigan and Illinois further prompt me to question the partisan 
role and the effect of party affiliation in the judicial system. In Michigan Supreme Court justices 
are nominated at party conventions, unlike the Circuit Court, but run in a non-partisan general 
election. The 2008 general election saw what has been described as one of the “dirtiest” 
campaigns out of all the Supreme Court contests over several states that year. 
36
 The Republican 
incumbent came under attack from the Democratic challenger and the “Justice at Stake 
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Campaign”.  The challenger’s campaign consisted of television advertisements describing the 
incumbent as “soft on terrorists”, “soft on sexual predators”, “soft on big business” and “sleeping 
on the job”. However over three quarters of these ads were paid for by special interest groups.37  
The most expensive judicial election campaign in history was witnessed in Illinois in 2004. The 
district-based seat on the Supreme Court saw the two candidates raising $9.3 million. This figure 
is more than what was raised by 18 of the 34 U.S. Senate races that same year. This particular 
Supreme Court district seat gives the justice the authority to fill vacancies in the Circuit Court 
between elections. Furthermore it has a widely recognized reputation for large tort awards. 
Therefore major contributors to the candidates included the American Tort Reform Association, 
labour leaders, trial lawyers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
14
 All of these campaign 
contributors had a vested interest in the outcome. This high spending on judicial elections as well 
as campaign contributions continues to concern advocates for judicial independence as Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor states, "In too many states, judicial elections are becoming political prize 
fights where partisans and special interests seek to install judges who will answer to them instead 
of the law and the Constitution." 
38
  
Although it is not easy to change the constitution in either Illinois or Michigan the fact that 
many proposals never made it through the general assembly in Illinois demonstrates that the 
political parties do not wish to relinquish their stake in judicial elections. Proposals can be 
initiated by the general public in Michigan and Illinois via petition signed by voters. Illinois 
requires at least 8% of the total votes cast for Governor in the last election, then 6 months after 
the legislative passage of the proposed amendment it is put to voters at the next general election. 
In order to be ratified it requires either a majority of votes in the election or 3/5
ths 
of those voting 
on the question. Similarly in Michigan a proposal petition must be signed by registered electors 
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equal in number to at least 10% of the total votes cast for governor in the most recent 
gubernatorial election. 
39
Following this the amendments proposed must then be ratified by a 
majority of voters at the next general election. In order to enact change it requires mass interest, 
which usually requires a high amount of funding from interest groups, once again prompting the 
question as to whether justice can be purchased. As stated previously Illinois has had more 
reform proposals put forward by the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations suggesting that legal 
professionals feel the system of judicial election through partisan method is flawed. This 
lingering question of the role that partisanship can play in justice and the role of interest groups 
as donors or fund raisers leads me to my own theory regarding election type and sentencing 
disparity. 
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Chapter 2: Why do Sentencing Differences 
exist and How to test them?  
Theoretical Framework 
By placing partisan labels on judges we are creating yet another arena in which partisan 
politics involves itself in a civil machine that should be independent and impartial. As Anthony 
Downs states the political party is “a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining 
office in a duly constituted election” (p 25). 40 My theory is formed from what partisan labelling 
does. In this study I hypothesize that partisan labelling creates sentencing disparity between 
judicial systems. This partisan label effect causes greater sentencing difference than either the 
label of Democrat or Republican. Following on from this the nature of partisan elections and 
party selection processes further exacerbates and encourages this issue.  
Introduction 
Following on from the literature review and the history and current state of judicial 
elections I will apply the above strands of scholarship and issues, partisan effect and election 
effect, in constructing my own theory. My study examines the annual state imprisonment 
numbers per county versus criminal case disposition numbers per county, of selected counties in 
Illinois and Michigan. Method of selection is discussed in further detail in the methodology 
section below. In this section I set out to explain why there might be a significant sentencing 
disparity between states that have partisan judicial elections and states that have non-partisan 
judicial elections. Furthermore my theory will also address any sentencing differences within 
states, e.g. counties of a particular partisan persuasion versus another county of differing partisan 
persuasion.  
Both the Illinois and Michigan Circuit and Trial Court Judiciary are guided by their 
respective Sentencing Guidelines, which are very similar on criminal matters. However as 
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Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) state the judiciary still has flexibility within these guidelines, 
and can depart from them, sentencing upwards or downwards of the guidelines. 
41
Given this, 
why are there differences between partisan and non-partisan states when it comes to sentencing, 
and secondly which method of judicial election would produce the more severe sentences? 
In the first section of my theory I will discuss party affiliation and how it could affect 
sentencing. Following this I will look at the possible effect of electoral competition and 
campaign contributions upon sentencing. In the next section I will discuss the within state 
sentencing differences caused by partisanship and finally I will look at the election effect.   
The problem with Labels 
Sentencing differences between partisan elected judiciaries and non-partisan judiciaries’ 
stems from the nature of partisanship, that being party selection processes and partisan election 
expectations. This partisan expectation is created when a candidate runs under a particular 
political party and that party desires to create a particular perception. In regards to justice it is 
probably a perception of being tough on crime. This perception is something that both parties 
may desire, it is the middle ground. In order to become the party’s candidate one is required to 
act in such a manner. Furthermore the party will then proclaim to the electorate that they are 
tough on crime, thus creating an expectation, of the candidate from the party and the party from 
the electorate. This expectation and obligation affects sentencing more so than any perceived 
ideological partisan differences. By discussing the nature of partisanship I am addressing how 
party labelling and party affiliation may affect judicial behaviour by transforming expectations 
of the judicial officers behaviour by the electorate and the party. 
As Aldrich (2011) discusses, a political party must stand for something to be successful 
and for both parties to remain major parties the contest will be for the middle ground, and 
politically popular conceptions of governance. 
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(a political party) “...is in equilibrium when its label conveys something to voters, and it 
is sufficiently attractive to enough voters so as, in turn, to attract ambitious politicians to 
affiliate with it and its label”. (pp 25) 42 
The middle ground when looking at politics and justice is the perception that the party is “tough 
on crime”, or “tough on criminals”. This battle for the middle ground is known as Median Voter 
Theorem, an intuitive theory regarding political behaviour and formulation of policy. 
43
 Briefly, 
the Median Voter Theorem explains a few of the phenomena that occur in majoritarian voting 
systems. Firstly, in my study it may explain why judicial candidates and parties more broadly, 
adopt similar platforms and campaign rhetoric. In order to win a majority, parties or judicial 
candidates must tailor their platforms to the median voter.
44
 For example, in my study, the 
Democratic and Republican candidates typically move their campaign platforms towards the 
middle ground, “tough on crime” during general elections campaigns. Just as the private market 
companies try to win over their competitor’s customers by making slight changes to better their 
products, so, too, do politicians deviate slightly from their opponent’s platform so as to gain 
votes. 
However it may be assumed that to be considered tough on law and order is a title non-
partisan judicial candidates would also desire. So why then do I not expect to see similar 
sentencing in non-partisan judicially elected states? Why would a judicial candidate without a 
partisan label not be as susceptible to this battle for the median? The reason for this is the 
process partisan candidates have to go through to be elected, e.g. party primaries, and this 
process places greater expectation of sentencing behaviour upon candidates. When a judicial 
candidate must be affiliated with a party, expectations of performance and actual performance 
fall back on the party rather than just the candidate, and the candidate feels they need to fulfil 
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these expectations in order to retain office otherwise they may not make it through party 
nomination for a retention election.  
Members of the judiciary are supposed to be indifferent to public opinion but how could 
they be if they have to campaign to be elected, re-elected or retained?  
 
Competition  
Expanding on my previous concept of the battle for the “middle ground” or Median Voter 
Theorem, I will look at how the more competitive the race the more a candidate will use party 
affiliation and that is when voters rely upon partisan expectations. Thus in the case of a judicial 
election the party requires their existing members of the judiciary, or incumbent candidates to 
fulfil these expectations, in this case the perceived “toughness on crime”. As highlighted in the 
previous section discussing current developments in judicial elections in the campaign for the 
Michigan Supreme Court, party stereotypes were used to cast credibility questions over the 
incumbent and candidate, therefore candidates are obligated to their party to conform to desired 
expectations. 
The next step on this point might be to assume that in counties with more competitive races 
we should see harsher sentencing. However I believe even in strongly dominated counties and 
circuits there will still be similar sentencing to bipartisan counties. This is because although the 
race in the general election may not be as competitive as a bipartisan circuit, the primary battle 
within the party is competitive and obligation to the party, once in office remains strong, as that 
party affiliation is the reason a candidate has taken office in a partisan dominated circuit. This 
further endorses the point of the role party primary’s play in effecting sentencing. Further to this, 
if a circuit is strongly dominated by one or another party, this circuit’s sentencing rates can be 
used as an example of a party’s response to crime, in future and varying electoral races, either by 
the party or the opposition. I refer to this as a partisan stronghold effect. This sort of action is 
31 
 
what Joseph Schumpter (referenced in Aldrich, 2011) describes as an ‘electoral machine’, the 
electoral machine being the party. He further states that partisan candidates will embrace the 
electoral machine, and allow partisan issues to mobilize the electorate, but only if competition 
forces them to do so. 
45
  
Although the battle for office in this instance may be as tight as a bipartisan circuit battle 
for the middle ground is always on a party’s agenda, and party affiliates and office holders must 
demonstrate this obligation. As Aldrich (2011) states incumbents fear losing the next election 
and we should see a need for incumbents to fulfil party expectation so that the party will endorse 
and support the candidate in order to prevent losing the next election. Partisan affiliated judges 
are required to fulfil party and voter expectations on which they campaigned on, such as being 
tough on crime. This popular position of “tough on crime”, or median in this study are the 
imprisonment rates, which should if significantly higher in a state with a partisan elected 
judiciary suggest evidence for this theory.    
My primary argument is that sentencing is significantly affected by partisan labelling and 
party affiliation, not one party or another, but the creation of an arena in which one area (justice) 
of partisan policy is debated and contested. As Streb (2007) states partisan elections allow 
national and larger political debates into the courtroom.  As stated in the work of Bright and 
Keenan (1995) both political parties like to be considered “tough on crime”, this combined with 
party nomination processes and expectations translates into partisan elected judges sentencing 
more severely than those judges who do not wear a partisan label. Judges elected through 
partisan method are not only accountable to their constituents but also to their party and their 
donors. Due to this I expect to find significant differences favouring harsher sentencing in 
partisan elected judiciaries than non-partisan elected judiciaries.  
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Can justice be purchased? 
Another area in which the judiciary in a state that has partisan judicial elections struggles 
to remain independent and impartial is that of campaign donations. This point builds upon above 
paragraphs that have discussed party expectations of a candidate. Once elected Circuit court 
judges, the focus of my study, serve a 6 year term then face retention election (in Illinois) or re-
election (in Michigan). Thus, in the case of partisan judges they are continually required to 
fundraise in order to keep their position and to gather donations typically sourced through their 
party. 
46
 Although non-partisan judges must also run for re-election (incumbency is designated 
on the ballot), they are held accountable by their constituents and do not require any form of 
party endorsement or party fundraising. This leads me to propose that their judicial behaviour is 
more independent than their partisan elected peers. A candidate should not have to argue for the 
popular badge of “tough on crime”, but rather the judiciary should campaign on independence 
and impartiality, values of which are suppose to be inherent in this office. 
This is a particularly contentious topic as discussed in Julie Archer’s (2012) article arguing 
that independence and impartiality can certainly be called into question with increased campaign 
donations from special interest groups. As she states, unlike a legislator who can legitimately 
favour certain views and policies, respond to voter concerns, promise to enact legislation and 
meet with donors to discuss legislation, the judiciary must be impartial, indifferent to public 
opinion and certainly not promise to rule in a particular way.
47
 In 2010 the US Supreme Court in 
the Citizen's United v. Federal Election Commission case ruled in favour of Citizen’s United. 
This ended restrictions on campaign donations by unions, corporations, and interest groups and 
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has subsequently seen the increase in campaign spending. 
48
 As Sobel and Hall (2007) suggest 
the nature of partisan elections lowers judicial quality because of donations given. These 
campaign contributions are given with the expectation of certain behaviours cultivated and 
expected by the party. Furthermore, as discussed by Tabbarrok and Helland (1999) judiciaries 
are significantly more likely to make rulings that favour their constituents.
49
  In my research I am 
not looking at civil claims but criminal, although the same principle applies, that is to say 
sentences will favour constituents (putting the criminals behind bars) and favour donors, 
ensuring the party message is upheld.  My argument is that campaign contributions and 
donations are another contributing factor to why partisan labelling and party affiliation cause 
significant sentencing differences, compared to a non-partisan elected circuit court.  
 
Difference within state 
Firstly when looking at the Partisan effect, as noted in the preceding literature review, 
results have been produced on either side of this debate. In contrast to the research conducted by 
Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), where they found democratic judges tending to be harsher on 
white-collar and environmental crime and republican judges being tougher on drug and street 
crime, I do not expect this to be the case with my own findings. I believe that both republican 
and democrats to be of equal severity in sentencing on crime because of the political 
requirements in relation to law and order.   
As referred to in the Literature Review, Sobel and Hall (2007) state there should be an 
“averaging out” of sentencing within the state due to reasonably even distribution of Democrat 
and Republican judges. 
50
 However I do not propose any significant differences between 
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Republican or Democratic counties but rather significant difference between counties due to the 
partisan stronghold effect. As stated above it is in the interest of both parties to converge to the 
median on law and order issues. Democrats are generally perceived as softer, on many issues, 
not just law and order, they sometimes go further than median expectation to de-bunk this 
perception.
51
 An example of this was Bill Clinton, as Governor of Arkansas, in his 1992 
Presidential election signing off on the execution of Rickey Ray Rector, a man of questionable 
mental health, and attending the execution. Presumably Republicans would then want to match 
this “toughness” exhibited by the Democrats rather than lose argument for the middle ground. If 
there was a significant difference between counties of a particular partisan persuasion it would 
allow one party or another to justifiably boost their credentials on law and order issues. Unlike 
contentious sentencing issues such as the death penalty, imprisonment does not contain the same 
stigma, on the surface is associated with a perceived toughness of crime and is welcomed, or at 
least accepted, by a significant majority in the community. 
 Another theory brought forward by Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) is that in a county or 
circuit dominated by a particular party, where their respective appellate district is of similar 
partisanship, one should see upwards law-based departures from the sentencing guidelines. Any 
appeal should be denied as both circuit court and appellate judges are of the same party. If this is 
the case we should see higher sentencing (imprisonment rates) in counties of high partisan 
domination, and likewise in districts of the same high rate of partisan domination. For the 
partisan county and district ratings in this study please refer to Table 3. In contrast to the above 
findings Ashenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab (1995) contested that due to court structure and the 
nature of criminal cases there would not be any significant difference in imprisonment between 
democratic or republican counties. 
52
 In my study I am only examining criminal cases and as 
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previously stated both parties wish to be considered tough on crime. The results will be 
disproportionately higher than the non-partisan elected judiciary of Michigan. As stated above I 
do not expect to find significant differences between parties. 
In this study I have also collected conviction rate data from each of the counties. For the 
same reason I do not expect to find sentencing disparity between counties, I do not expect to find 
significant differences between democratic or republican counties. I also expect to find 
similarities in the convictions rates between the states. The reason there would be such a 
disparity between states in conviction to sentence is because as Streb (2007) states, this is one 
area where a judicial officer has a lot of influence and there is a tendency in partisan labelled 
judiciaries to fall back on party expectations.  
53
  
 
An Election Year Effect? 
Bright and Keenan (1995) found in their research that sentences where significantly 
harsher during election years.  However with both Illinois and Michigan their Circuit or trial 
courts have staggered 6 year terms, for example one third of the bench may be facing election in 
a given election year, whilst another third will not face election for another two or another four 
years. Furthermore this effect is not the primary motivation for this case study; however one can 
not discount this theory on causes of sentencing disparity. Both Michigan and Illinois use 
elections to select their judiciary, and accordingly if this theory is to hold there should not be a 
significant difference between the states, but rather significant differences between the different 
years, election year or not. I do not believe this to be the case as there are elections within such a 
short space of time and there is always someone up for election. Bright and Keenan (1995) make 
the point that a perception of toughness on criminals is popular with voters and hence severity of 
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sentences is greater in election years. However for the above reason I do not believe this will 
create significant differences between election and non-election years. Their point on perception 
is similar to my theory as to why there are sentencing differences between states of differing 
judicial election type. As stated above these differences are due to the partisan labelling of the 
judicial candidates and their obligations back to their party rather than a judge’s own popular 
perception during election years.  
Conclusion 
In summary my theory centres on the very nature of partisan elections and party affiliation. 
Partisan elections at all levels of governance see a battle for the middle ground, so when 
focussed on the arena of justice this features the popular perception of “tough on crime”. 
Furthermore party affiliation means judicial candidates have an obligation to their party and their 
donors. Once elected this obligation extends to their constituents who it can be argued voted for 
them because of their party’s reputation on crime. In order for an incumbent to keep their 
position they require the support and endorsement from their party and their donor’s even in a 
retention election. It is for these reasons that there are significant sentencing differences between 
partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries and also why there are no significant differences 
within states between differing parties, and no significant effect due to the election cycle. 
 
Methodology 
Selection and Data collection 
In order to determine whether there are sentencing differences between partisan and non-
partisan elected judiciaries I firstly had to choose two similar (demographically and 
geographically) states that used either the partisan or non-partisan judicial selection. The 2010 
US census data led me to focus my study on Illinois (partisan) and Michigan (non-partisan). In 
order to compare sentencing data I needed to focus on similar courts, those being the Circuit 
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Courts of Illinois and the Trial Courts of Michigan- both of which deal with all level of criminal 
case. I have conducted a quantitative study of Circuit Court (Illinois) and Trial Court (Michigan) 
criminal sentencing imprisonment rates and conviction rates per county over three consecutive 
years- 2008, 2009, 2010. I have focused on caseload data (total dispositions and convictions) and 
imprisonment rates per county obtained via Illinois Supreme Court Statistical Summary 2008, 
2009, 2010 and the Michigan Department of Correction Statistical Report 2008, 2009, 2010 and 
the Michigan Courts Circuit Caseload Report 2008, 2009, 2010. 
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County Details 
Circuits of Michigan tend to be divided along County lines, whilst in Illinois some Circuits 
are made up of several counties; however Cook, Dupage, Will and Lake have their own Circuit 
due to their large population. Refer to Figures 1 – 6 in regards to County and Circuit locations. 
The data collected pertains exclusively to these counties, not the circuit. I chose counties from 
Michigan and Illinois that are a broad cross-section of the state; metropolitan, regional and rural. 
Using data from the United States Census Bureau from the 2010 census I was able to collate the 
county data. This has allowed me to compare counties of similar demographics, acting as a 
control in my study, see Tables 1 and 2. Metropolitan counties include Cook, Dupage, Lake and 
Will in Illinois, and Oakland, St Clair, Washtenaw and Wayne in Michigan. Regional counties 
include Grundy, Kendall and Sangamon in Illinois and Berrien, Bay and Clinton/Gratiot in 
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Michigan. Rural counties include Fulton, Jefferson and Perry in Illinois and Delta, Hillsdale and 
Tuscola in Michigan. These classifications have been devised by proximity to major centres 
combined with population. The demographics I have used are median age, racial demography, 
median male and female income, and high school and college attainment rates. By choosing 
these particular demographic breakdowns it has allowed me to limit variables attributable to any 
significant difference in imprisonment rate between the two states. Furthermore using these 
demographic factors also allows for generalisation of results to counties of similar demographic 
make-up.  
The data for Clinton and Gratiot Counties (Michigan) was combined as the data from the 
Michigan Department of Corrections was provided by circuit (unlike Illinois where it is provided 
by county) and both counties are within the circuit. 
Judicial Details and Partisan Classification 
In order to conduct the within state differential sentencing testing I had to establish partisan 
ratings for the Illinois counties. These partisan labels are created through the following method; 
firstly a list of circuit court judges was obtained from the Illinois Courts website and then each 
judge’s candidate disclosure details were obtained from the Illinois State Board of Elections. 
From this information I was then able to rate a county as either Democratic or Republican. If 
over 65% of the judges were of a particular party the County was classified accordingly. These 
classifications can be seen in Table 3. Unfortunately I was unable to obtain partisan affiliation 
information for all of the judges in Cook, Grundy and Perry counties. This was sometimes due to 
them running unopposed in special elections, or being appointed as interim judges by the 
Supreme Court until the next election, serving on the bench for less than 2 years. However this 
partisan unaccountability is only relevant to a small percentage of the judges and would not 
affect the validity of my results.  
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Another control variable needing to be accounted for is the when and why Illinois and 
Michigan have differing forms of judicial election. As discussed in the History and Context 
section above I was able to rule out any significant difference in sentencing being a result of the 
reason either partisan or non-partisan states have the judicial elections they do, e.g. Partisan 
elections chosen to combat a high crime rate or weak sentencing. Rather the difference being due 
to differing support for judicial reform within the states.  
 Another similarity between the states that acts as a control are the requirements needed to 
be a judicial candidate. In Illinois candidates are required to be US citizens, a county/circuit 
resident and have a licence to practice law in Illinois. In Michigan candidates are required to be a 
qualified elector of the circuit (registered voter in County/circuit), hold a licence to practice law 
in Michigan, 5 years legal practice and have to be less than 70 years old at time of candidacy. 
Controlling for External Causal Factors 
One of the major differences between counties of Illinois and Michigan was that of 
population. Illinois has a population of 12, 830 632 whilst Michigan has a population of 9, 883 
635. To avoid problems with population numbers skewing data I used percentages rather than 
raw numbers, for example Cook County (Illinois) has a population of close to 5.2 million whilst 
Wayne County (Michigan) has just fewer than 2 million and thus numbers of convicted and 
imprisoned persons would be much larger in Cook County simply because of population 
difference. 
Once data was collected and collated average percentages were calculated for number of 
cases to number of convictions per County, and number of convictions to number of 
imprisonment sentences. Following this a state average percentage was calculated for each year 
for both conviction percentage and imprisonment percentage.  
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Research Design 
Hypothesis:  States with partisan judicial elections will have significantly greater 
imprisonment rates in comparison to circuit/trial court with a non-partisan elected judiciary, 
(Illinois average imprisonment % > Michigan average imprisonment %). 
Hypothesis (2nd):  There are no significant differences within state (Illinois) of sentencing 
(imprisonment) and conviction rates between counties described as Democrat or Republican. 
Null hypothesis:  There will be no significant difference in imprisonment rates from circuit 
courts between partisan elected judiciaries and non-partisan elected judiciaries,  (Illinois average 
imprisonment rate = Michigan imprisonment rate). 
The dependent variable in this study is the number of people entering the prison system, whilst 
the independent variable is the type of judicial selection (partisan or non-partisan election) which 
determines the number of people entering the prison system. 
Testing for Difference 
In order to test for any significant difference t-tests were conducted between the state 
conviction and imprisonment rates for each year. To attend to any difference being due to 
variables such as racial demographics or geography, data was collated into these respective 
groups and compared to the overall county data from the selected state. The conviction rate and 
imprisonment rate from counties of both Illinois and Michigan with a black population of 10% or 
greater had their data collated and a one-tailed t-test was used to determine whether the 
conviction rates or imprisonment rates were significantly different from the total of selected 
counties from the state. Due to the higher population of Hispanics in Illinois I also collated the 
data from counties with 80% or less white population and conducted a one-tailed t-test 
comparing this data to the state data. A similar procedure was conducted for the metropolitan, 
regional and rural counties. Firstly data was collated for each of the regions for both states and 
then t-tests were conducted comparing this data to the total state data. The final test conducted 
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was that of comparing counties from Illinois and Michigan that are most similar to each other 
demographically. By conducting these comparisons I wish to eliminate most of the external 
causal factors any difference maybe attributable to, and therefore any significant difference 
between the states is more likely attributable to the difference in judicial election.     
To address any within state difference between republican or democratic circuits, data was 
also collated into percentages, and then standard deviation were calculated and t-tests 
undertaken. The Bipartisan County in this study was also looked at versus the state average in 
order to examine the possible competition effect. 
In order to ensure any significant results are due to different election processes rather than 
external causal factors I have tried to account for as many differences as possible. These include 
demographics, history of electoral process and judicial candidacy requirements. Furthermore 
extensive testing is to be conducted to test for any the effect of external causal factors.  
N.B. When I refer to total state average, or data I am referring to the counties from the state I 
have selected for this study and the figures collected and collated from them. 
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Chapter 3: Testing the Theory  
Results 
In conducting my significant tests I used the significance level of 0.05, the standard 
measure for most political science and public administration research. If the p-value from a t-test 
is below 0.05 this indicates the variances between the two data sets are significantly different. 
Further to note I used one-tailed t-tests to test whether data was significantly different in a 
particular direction, higher or lower, which is important in determining not only whether data is 
significantly different but in which direction. When using the term imprisonment rate as stated in 
my methodology I mean the amount of persons who once convicted are sentenced to prison.  
Total State data  
Represented in Table 4 are the individual county case dispositions, conviction numbers and 
rates, and imprisonment numbers and rates. The selected Illinois counties had a case disposition 
to conviction percentage (conviction rate) of 62.62% (2008), 65.33% (2009) and 61.46% (2010). 
The selected Michigan counties had conviction rates of 69.49% (2008), 70.67% (2009) and 
72.24% (2010). The one-tailed t-tests did not return any significant difference between the 
selected counties of Illinois and Michigan [p > 0.05, p = 0.15 (2008), p = 0.20 (2009), p = 0.06 
(2010)]. 
The second part of Table 4 which represents the rates of imprisonment from conviction 
shows the following results. Illinois’ selected counties had average imprisonment rates of 
41.55% (2008), 40.93% (2009) and 37.39% (2010). Michigan’s selected counties had average 
imprisonment rates of 25.73% (2008), 25.62% (2009) and 28.06% (2010). The one-tailed t-tests 
returned significant results [p > 0.05, p = 0.00 (2008) and p = 0.00 (2009) and p = 0.04 (2010)]. 
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Racial factors   
Table 5 and 6 represent the rates of conviction and imprisonment for counties with a black 
(as per 2010 census classification) population of 10% or greater from both Illinois and Michigan. 
Table 5 returned average conviction rates of 63.51% (2008), 66.86% (2009) and 64.15% (2010). 
These counties returned average imprisonment rates of 56.80% (2008), 55.33% (2009) and 
50.54% (2010). A one-tailed t-test was done with the data from Table 5 and the Illinois data from 
Table 4. The p-values returned from the conviction rates were not significant in any of the three 
years [p < 0.05, p= 0.47 (2008), p = 0.44 (2009), p = 0.42 (2010)]. The p-values returned from 
the imprisonment rates were significant for all three years [p < 0.05, p = 0.00 (2008), p = 0.01 
(2009), p = 0.01 (2010)]. Table 6 had conviction rates of 69.89% (2008), 70.15% (2009) and 
71.51% (2010). The average imprisonment rates were 23.44% (2008), 24.79% (2009) and 
24.09% (2010). The results from Table 6 and the Michigan data from Tables 4 were used in 
performing a one-tailed t-test. No significant differences were returned from the conviction rates 
[p-value < 0.05, p = 0.49 (2008), p = 0.48 (2009), p = 0.47 (2010)], or the imprisonment rates [p-
value < 0.05, p = 0.24 (2008), p = 0.41 (2009), p = 0.16 (2010)]. 
Table 7 represents the conviction and imprisonment rates from Illinois counties with a 
white (as per 2010 census classification) population of 80% or less. The average conviction rates 
from these counties were 68.65% (2008), 69.72% (2009) and 68.84% (2010). The average 
imprisonment rates from these counties were 44.45% (2008), 44.07% (2009) and 40.47% (2010). 
Results from this table were used with the Illinois results from Table 4 in conducting a one-tailed 
t-test. The results from the conviction rate were not significant [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.27 (2008), 
p = 0.33 (2009), p = 0.22 (2010)]. Nor were the results from the imprisonment rate [p-value < 
0.05, p = 0.33 (2008), p = 0.31 (2009), p = 0.30 (2010)]. The selected counties in Michigan that 
fitted the 80% or less white population criteria were the same as those in Table 6 and thus the 
results are the same as stated in the above paragraph.  
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Geographical Factors 
Table 10 looks at the metropolitan selected counties in the Illinois data. This data is then 
compared to the Illinois state data from Table 4 using a one-tailed t-test. The average conviction 
rates for Illinois metropolitan counties were 63.56% (2008), 64.97% (2009) and 64.42% (2010). 
The average imprisonment rates in Illinois metropolitan counties were 44.09% (2008), 45.98% 
(2009) and 42.02% (2010). The one-tailed t-test showed no significant difference between the 
Illinois metropolitan data and the state data for either conviction rates [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.46 
(2008), p = 0.49 (2009), p = 0.38 (2010)] or imprisonment rates [p < 0.05, p = 0.37 (2008), p = 
0.24 (2009), p = 0.26 (2010)].Table 11 represents the metropolitan counties of the Michigan data 
set. This data was compared to the Michigan state data using a one-tailed t-test. The average 
conviction rates in Michigan metropolitan counties were 68.35% (2008), 69.08% (2009) and 
68.15% (2010). The average imprisonment rates in Michigan metropolitan counties were 22.41% 
(2008), 22.12% (2009) and 21.59% (2010). The one-tailed t-test showed no significant results 
between Michigan metropolitan counties and the selected county state data conviction rates [p- 
value < 0.05, p = 0.46 (2008), p = 0.44 (2009) and p = 0.33 (2010)]. The one-tailed t-test also 
showed no significant difference in the imprisonment rates between the Michigan metropolitan 
counties and the Michigan state data [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.17 (2008), p = 0.20 (2009) and 0.06 
(2010)]. 
Table 12 and 13 represent the regional county data sets from Illinois and Michigan 
respectively. The average conviction rates for Illinois regional counties were 66.63% (2008), 
70.55% (2009) and 65.31% (2010). The average imprisonment rates for Illinois regional counties 
were 47.69% (2008), 42.59% (2009) and 37.44% (2010). The one-tail t-test conducted 
comparing the Illinois regional county data to the state county data was not significant for either 
the conviction rate [p-value <0.05, 0.39 (2008), 0.35 (2009) and 0.40 (2010)] or the 
imprisonment rate [p-value < 0.05, 0.24 (2008), 0.42 (2009), 0.50 (2010)].The average 
conviction rates for Michigan regional counties were 75.79% (2008), 75% (2009) and 75.82% 
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(2010). The average imprisonment rates for Michigan regional counties were 25.50% (2008), 
26.69% (2009) and 30.63 (2010). The one-tail t-test showed no significant differences between 
the Michigan regional counties and the state data in the conviction rate, [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.26 
(2008), p = 0.31 (2009) and p = 0.36 (2010)] or the imprisonment rate [p -value < 0.05, p = 0.48 
(2008), p = 0.43 (2009) and p = 0.28]. 
Tables 14 and 15 represent the rural counties from the selected counties in this study in 
Illinois and Michigan respectively. The average conviction rates in Illinois rural counties were 
57.34% (2008), 60.59% (2009) and 53.67% (2010). The average imprisonment rates were 
32.02% (2008), 32.53% (2009) and 31.16% (2010). The one-tailed t-test did not show a 
significant difference between the conviction rates of the rural Illinois counties and the total 
Illinois county data [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.25 (2008), p = 0.28 (2009) and p = 0.25 (2010)]. 
Neither did it show a significant difference between the imprisonment rates of Illinois counties 
and the total Illinois county data [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.11 (2008), p = 0.10 (2009) and p = 0.20 
(2010)].The average conviction rates in Michigan rural counties were 64.71% (2008), 68.47% 
(2009) and 74.11% (2010). The average imprisonment rates were 30.38% (2008), 29.22% (2009) 
and 34.11% (2010). The one-tailed t-test did not show a significant difference in the conviction 
rate between the rural Michigan county data and the total Michigan county data [p-value < 0.05, 
p = 0.18 (2008), p = 0.34 (2009) and p = 0.38 (2010)] or the imprisonment rate [p-value < 0.05, p 
= 0.34 (2008), p= 0.38 (2009) and p = 0.33 (2010). 
Table 16 compares individual counties from each state that are most demographically 
similar. This comparison simply takes the difference between the county’s conviction and 
imprisonment rate for each listed year. The difference between the first pairing of Cook and 
Wayne showed the following difference in conviction rates; 4.22% (2008), 2.60% (2009) and 
1.78% (2010). The imprisonment rates showed the following difference; 37.25% (2008), 39.22% 
(2009) and 33.48% (2010).The second pairing showed the following differences in conviction 
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rate; 2.27% (2008), 3.36% (2009) and 3.94 (2010). The imprisonment rate saw the following 
differences; 5.60% (2008), 8.71% (2009) and 8.96% (2010). The third pairing had the following 
differences in conviction rate; 10.99% (2008), 5.96% (2009) and 13.50% (2010). The 
imprisonment rates had the following differences; 10.69% (2008), 14.46% (2009) and 9.81% 
(2010).The fourth pairing had the following differences in conviction rate; 45.22% (2008), 
37.25% (2009) and 48.59% (2010). The imprisonment rate displayed the following difference; 
37.45% (2008), 29.36% (2009) and 20.77% (2010).The fifth pairing had the following 
differences in conviction rate; 3.64% (2008), 8.98% (2009) and 0.36% (2010). The 
imprisonment rates displayed the following differences; 3.02% (2008), 10.68% (2009) and 
6.74% (2010). The sixth pairing had the following differences in conviction rates; 19.40% 
(2008), 21.52% (2009) and 29.60% (2010). The imprisonment rate had the following 
differences; 17.73% (2008), 9.30% (2009) and 2.35% (2010). The seventh pairing had the 
following differences in conviction rate; 6.36% (2008), 11.12% (2009) and 32.09% (2010). The 
imprisonment rates displayed the following differences; 15.82% (2008), 10.06% (2009) and 
13.25% (2010). The eighth pairing had the differences in conviction rate; 18.12% (2008), 
20.49% (2009) and 14.90% (2010). The following differences were seen in the imprisonment 
rates; 15.84% (2008), 1.84% (2009) and 0.94% (2010). The ninth pairing had the following 
differences in conviction rates; 11.71% (2008), 11.62% (2009) and 14.83% (2010). The 
following differences were seen in the imprisonment rates; 28.32% (2008), 30.52% (2009) and 
18.27% (2010). The final pairing had the following differences in conviction rate; 18.29% 
(2008), 12.46% (2009) and 11.91% (2010). The following differences were seen in the 
imprisonment rates; 18.12% (2008), 19.02% (2009) and 11.80% (2010). 
Within State Difference  
Table 8 represents the conviction and imprisonment data from the Illinois counties 
determined Democrat or Republican. The average conviction rates for the Democrat counties 
were 57.05% (2008), 60.22% (2009) and 57.74% (2010). The average conviction rates for the 
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Republican counties were 69.86% (2008), 72.54% (2009) and 68.82% (2010). A one-tailed t-test 
showed that the conviction rates were not significantly different [p < 0.05, p = 0.15 (2008), p = 
0.14 (2009) and 0.19 (2010)]. The average imprisonment rates for the Democrat counties were 
37.87% (2008), 38.73% (2009) and 34.07% (2010). The average imprisonment rates for the 
Republican counties were 48% (2008), 44.72% (2009) and 40.50% (2010). A one-tailed t-test 
showed that the imprisonment results were not significant [p < 0.05, p =0.13 (2008), p = 0.23 
(2009) and p = 0.20 (2010)].   
Table 9 represents the Bipartisan County versus the state averages. The conviction rate for 
2008 was 61.48%, the state’s average (selected counties from this study, data from Table 4) was 
62.62%. The imprisonment rate for 2008 was 34.18% and the state average was 41.55%. In 2009 
the conviction rate was 62.03%, Illinois had an average conviction rate of 65.33%. In 2009 the 
imprisonment rate was 36.73%, the state’s imprisonment rate in 2009 was 40.93%. In 2010 the 
conviction rate was 50.64%, whilst the Illinois average in this study was 61.46%. The 
imprisonment rate for 2010 was 41.53%, the state average was 37.39. A t-test could not be 
conducted as there was only one bipartisan county.  
 
Discussion 
Following on from the result section I will now discuss how the results from my study 
validate parts of my theory, in particular my hypothesis; that partisan judicial elections produce 
significantly higher imprisonment rates. I will also examine how the results looking at external 
causal factors, race, geography and other demographics, may discredit my theory. By breaking 
down the counties into different area and racial groupings my results should have the ability to 
be more widely generalized, either to other counties within the studied states or to other states of 
similar demographics. Following on from this I will explore the results of the within state 
partisan difference and then look at the possible election year effect. This will be followed by a 
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general discussion about the results and the study generally. Finally I will examine the 
implications of the results on further scholarship and hopeful applications of this study. 
The Data and the Theory 
Although not significantly different between Michigan and Illinois it is interesting to see 
that conviction rates for Michigan were consistently higher than Illinois; 6.87% in 2008, 5.34% 
in 2009 and 10.78% in 2010. The one-tailed t-test from 2010 returned a figure of p = 0.06, 
suggesting evidence of difference however just outside the level of significance for this study. 
These results are somewhat in contrast to what I expected and stated in my theory, that there 
would be no, or a limited difference and although the results were not significantly different the 
non-partisan judiciary of Michigan conviction rates are markedly higher than those of Illinois. 
These figures are to be kept in mind when looking at the imprisonment rates between the two 
states because as stated in the theory section and by Streb (2011), sentencing is where a 
judicially officer can exert greater influence, and party expectation and obligation play their 
part.
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The main theory of my research rests upon whether there are sentencing differences 
between partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries, and if there are, whether the partisan 
elected judiciary is significantly higher than the non-partisan. As I hypothesised the 
imprisonment rates were significantly higher in Illinois than Michigan [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.00 
(2008), p = 0.00 (2009) and p = 0.04 (2010)]. Illinois’ average imprisonment rate was higher 
than that of Michigan in 2008 by 15.82%, 15.31% in 2009 and 9.33% in 2010. It could be said 
that generally you are 10% more likely if convicted of a crime in Illinois to be sent to prison than 
in Michigan. Although I have looked at counties that are similar in order to ensure these 
significant differences are due to partisan electoral process and not external causal factors, 
further results testing for external causal factors will be examined. 
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Also of interest in these results are the standard deviations from each state. Illinois returned 
standard deviations of 12.31% in 2008, 11.05% in 2009 and 10.47% in 10.47%. Michigan 
returned standard deviations of 9.19% in 2008, 9.79% in 2009 and 11.18% in 2010. Apart from 
the figures from 2010 Michigan has tended to return smaller standard deviations and only one 
outlier (Hillsdale County), thus more uniform results, hinting towards more consistent sentencing 
across the state. However the partisan elected judiciary of Illinois tends to have larger standard 
deviation in its results and more outliers are present in the data (Cook County, Sangamon 
County, Perry County), suggesting greater variation in sentencing across the state.  This concern 
in consistency was an area I did not touch upon in my theory and is worth further research.  
The results pertaining to counties that are strongly dominated by Democrats or 
Republicans, refer to Table 3, further suggest my theory’s validity in regards to the role party 
primaries might play in influencing obligations of a judicial officer back to the party. The 
imprisonment rate for Cook County is consistently higher than the total of selected Illinois 
counties for 2008: Cook County 58.16%, state average 41.55%, 2009: Cook County, 60.67%, 
state average 40.93% and 2010: Cook County 55.92%, state average 37.39%. Given the well 
documented and acknowledged fact that Cook County is a Democratic Party stronghold, these 
results perhaps fulfil the notion put forward that democrats actively try to debunk the perception 
of soft by imposing harsher sentences. 
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 Sangamon County, a republican dominated circuit also 
had consistently higher imprisonment rates than the state average, 2008- Sangamon 60.31%, 
state average 41.55%, 2009- Sangamon 56.16%, state average 40.93% and 2010- Sangamon 
48.50%, state average 37.39%. The imprisonment rates for Dupage County, considered a 
Republican stronghold, were below the state average, however within the standard deviation. 
This result provides evidence counter to my primary competition/party obligation theory.    
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Racial Factors   
In ruling out external causal factors upon any sentencing differences, tests were conducted 
comparing counties with 10% or greater black population to the total state data, refer to Tables 5 
and 6. Illinois has a higher percentage Hispanic and mixed population than Michigan. Therefore 
to further discount any sentencing disparity due to racial factors counties with less than 80% 
white population were also compared to the total state data, refer to Table 7. Three Illinois 
counties had populations of 10% or greater black population, they were Cook, Sangamon and 
Will. They did not return significantly higher conviction rates to the state data. They did however 
produce significantly higher imprisonment rate results than the state data [p-value < 0.05, p = 
0.00 (2008), p = 0.01 (2009) and 0.00 in (2010)]. The 10% or greater black counties in Michigan 
included Berrien, Oakland, Washtenaw and Wayne. These counties did not produce significantly 
higher conviction rates or imprisonment rates when compared to their state data. The counties 
with less than 80% white population in Illinois were Cook, Dupage, Kendall, Lake and Will. The 
conviction rates and the imprisonment rates were not significantly higher than the total state data. 
The results produced by the 10% or greater black population counties in Illinois are concerning 
for the validity of my theory, however the black population percentage of Illinois is 14.8% and 
Michigan is 14.3%.
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 This suggests that significant sentencing difference is not due to a greater 
black population but it does suggest that there may be some racial concerns in these counties that 
may be exacerbated by the partisan judicial elections.  
 Also of interest when looking at these groupings of data were the standard deviation sizes 
in the imprisonment rates. The four Michigan counties produced much smaller standard 
deviations, 2.46% (2008), 3.26% (2009) and 2.56% (2010), than their Illinois counterparts. The 
three Illinois counties produced standard deviations of 4.35% (2008), 5.80% (2009) and 4.70% 
(2010), close to double the size of those produced by the Michigan data. 
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Geographical Factors 
In examining the results from the different area groupings, metropolitan, regional and 
rural, although there were no significant differences there were some figures worth examining 
further. The Michigan metropolitan county data in Table 11 has large standard deviations in its 
conviction rates however it has very close, in comparison to all other standard deviations in this 
study, imprisonment rates. All of its imprisonment rates, 22.41 (2008), 22.12% (2009) and 
21.59% (2010) are lower than the Michigan averages, 25.73% (2008), 25.62% (2009) and 
28.06% (2010). The imprisonment rate for Michigan metropolitan counties in 2010 was 
suggestive of being significantly lower than the state data [p-value < 0.05, p = 0.06]. This data is 
in contrast to that of the Illinois metropolitan county data. The Illinois metropolitan data 
imprisonment rates, 44.09% (2008), 45.98% (2009) and 42.02% (2010), presented in Table 10, is 
consistently higher than the state averages, 41.55% (2008), 40.93% (2009) and 37.39% (2010). 
However it is not significantly different. Furthermore the standard deviations in the Illinois 
metropolitan data imprisonment rates are more than double those from the Michigan 
metropolitan data. The non-partisan judicially elected metropolitan counties present a more 
unified imprisonment data set than their Illinois counterparts. These results in standard deviation 
are similar to those presented previously in this discussion. 
The data from the regional counties, Table 12 and 13, present no significant results and no 
results out of the general state trends seen in Table 4.  
Also of note was the data from the rural counties compared to its respective state data. The 
rural Illinois counties trended lower than the state data in both the conviction rate and the 
imprisonment rate. Although the results were not significantly different in 2009 the rural 
counties average imprisonment rate was 8.4% lower than the state average [p-value < 0.05, p = 
0.10]. Unlike the trend in the metropolitan counties above, the Michigan rural counties have a 
larger average imprisonment rate than the state average, 30.38% (2008), 29.22% (2009), 34.11% 
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(2010) vs. 25.73 (2008), 25.62 (2009), 28.06% (2010). However of interest in this set of data is 
the size of standard deviation in the imprisonment rates, 17.08% (2008), 16.87% (2009) and 
19.68% (2010). The outlier in this set of data was the results from Hillsdale County. 
From these results I can confirm that in my study no significant difference in sentencing 
occurring between the two states was due to regional demographic differences. None of the one-
tailed t-tests conducted between the area data and the respective state data returned significant 
results. 
The matching up of “like” counties from each state has allowed me to further exclude 
possible sentencing differences due to external causal factors. When looking at results in Table 
16 I would like to note that the final three match ups, Kendall - Clinton/Gratiot, Will – Bay and 
Grundy – St Clair are not demographically similar enough to make valid comparisons. Thus any 
differences between these counties would not be able to rule out difference due to external causal 
factors. Table 16 provides further evidence for my theory suggesting that party affiliation causes 
higher rates of sentencing. Although these results cannot be tested for significance it is worth 
noting that large differences are present between “like” counties, Cook and Wayne, Sangamon 
and Berrien, Tuscola and Jefferson, all of which have Illinois counties with higher imprisonment 
rates. Also of note in these results is the large difference between Sangamon County and Berrien 
County’s conviction rates, with Berrien County being more than double that of Sangamon in 
2008 and 2010, 45.07% vs. 90.29% (2008) and 43.09% vs. 91.68% (2010). However these 
results are turned around when comparing imprisonment rates with Sangamon County having 
more than double that of Berrien County, 60.31% vs. 22.86% (2008) and 56.16% vs. 26.80% 
(2009). The counties of Jefferson and Tuscola had a similar pattern in results as those above, but 
not as extreme. This pattern reflects the previous point in regards to partisan elected judiciary’s 
obligation to their party when exerting influence upon sentencing. Only one of the pairings in 
this test had a Michigan county with larger imprisonment rates than its Illinois pair, that being 
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the pairing of Fulton County and Hillsdale County. As I have stated previously in this discussion 
the imprisonment rate data from Hillsdale County is an outlier and consequently this result is not 
surprising.  The results from this comparison further validate my theory that significantly higher 
sentencing from partisan elected judiciaries than that of non-partisan elected judiciaries is due to 
difference in election type, rather than other external causal factors. 
Although a linear regression was not conducted impressionistically it does not look like the 
imprisonment rate difference between Illinois and Michigan is due to racial or geographic 
factors.  
Within State Difference 
From the selected counties in Illinois I had five counties that I identified as Democratic 
(over 65% of the circuit bench was from one particular party- see Table 3), Cook, Grundy, 
Jefferson, Lake and Perry. Four counties I identified as Republican, Dupage, Kendall, Sangamon 
and Will, and one county I identified as bipartisan, Fulton.  
The comparison of Democratic counties to the Republican counties did not produce 
significantly different conviction rates. However the Republican counties produced consistently 
higher conviction rates, 12.81% (2008), 12.32% (2009) and 11.08% (2010). This same trend was 
also seen in the imprisonment rates with the one-tailed t-test returning no significantly higher 
results, but the Republican counties had higher rates of imprisonment, 10.13% (2008), 5.99% 
(2009) and 6.43% (2010). The fact that republican counties did not have significantly higher 
conviction or imprisonment rates conforms to my theory. That theory being that not one party or 
another causes sentencing disparity but rather sentencing is affected by the process of partisan 
candidate selection and Median Voter Theorem. If this trend, that of higher conviction and 
imprisonment in Republican circuits, was seen across the state it would allow the Republican 
party machine to claim the middle ground on law on order and the badge as “tougher on crime”. 
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A greater sample of counties would help to either dispel or confirm the trend seen in these 
results.  
In my theory I discussed the idea of competition and how this might affect sentencing 
results. I claimed that it was not competition in a general election that would result in a greater 
obligation of a judicial officer back to the party. Rather it was competition in the party primary 
that would see harsher sentencing in a county within a circuit of a partisan stronghold. Evidence 
in favour of this theory is present above (see the results for Cook County and Sangamon County) 
in favour of that theory. I will now look at the bipartisan county of Fulton County, as seen in 
Table 9, in order to complete the analysis on within state difference. The figures from Fulton 
County fall within the standard deviation range for the results from this state for both conviction 
rates and imprisonment rates. For all results, bar one, Fulton County was below the state average. 
The one result that was above was the imprisonment rate for 2010, where Fulton County was 
4.14% higher than the state average but the state standard deviation was 10.47%. This result 
presents further evidence in favour of my theory in regards to the effect internal party 
mechanisms have upon judicial behaviour once in office.  
Election Year Effect 
As stated previously my study was not focused on this phenomenon as both my data sets 
are from states which have elections. However if the very act of having elections affected 
sentencing data upwards as stated by Bright and Keenan (1995), I should see larger 
imprisonment rates in years 2008 and 2010, in comparison to 2009. The average imprisonment 
rates for the total selected counties of Illinois were 41.55% in 2008, 40.93% in 2009 and 37.39% 
in 2010, refer to Table 4. These results are highest in an election year, 2008, but are also lowest 
in an election year, 2010. The average imprisonment rates for Michigan selected counties was 
25.73% in 2008, 25.62% in 2009 and 28.06% in 2010, refer to Table 4. Although the average 
imprisonment rates are lowest in the non-election year, 2009, they are only lower by 0.11%, 
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which is not strong evidence for the election effect paradigm. I am not saying that the election 
year effect does not exist, however my study was not set up to test it alone and my results show 
very small evidence in favour of it.  
 
General Discussion 
Although the counties I have examined and collected data upon have validated my 
hypothesis suggesting that partisan elected judiciaries result in higher sentencing than non-
partisan elected judiciaries, it must be stated that my study reflects the results of only ten 
counties within each state and not the state as a whole. Further to this, the results looking at 
within state difference between Republican counties, Democratic counties and the bipartisan 
county further confirm my theory that it is party mechanisms and selection process that results in 
harsher sentencing. However although the results between Democratic and Republican counties 
were not significant the Republican counties tended to have higher conviction and imprisonment 
rates. However the highest imprisonment rates of all the counties was the heavily Democratic 
dominated Cook County. The median voter theorem, the battle to be perceived as tough on 
crime, can be used to explain why when judicial officers have partisan labels they are obligated 
to sentence in a manner that best reflects their party.  
As stated in my theoretical framework, logic would prescribe that we should see a 
convergence to the mean on this law and order issue of sentencing, with tough sentencing, in 
partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries. I have attempted to address this with putting 
forward the partisan primary process and subsequent obligation a partisan judicial officer has to 
their party as a reason to why partisan elected judiciaries should produce higher rates of 
imprisonment when compared to non-partisan elected judiciaries. 
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By setting up this type of quantitative analysis these results have the ability to be 
generalised to states of similar circumstance. Nevertheless one must keep in mind differing 
external causal factors at play in different counties and states. 
The concern that taking away the partisan label in judicial elections would result in a 
misinformed or ill informed voter is flawed, as justice should be independent of political and 
partisan debate. A justice’s ability to conduct impartial and independent judgements should not 
be influenced by the party he or she is associated with, and a voter should be voting for a 
candidate because of their judicial ability and not political standing. Campaigns should be about 
competency and independence and not politics and policy. Currently in Michigan different 
branches of the Bar Association try overcome this perceived flaw by publishing a review of 
current judicial candidates and rating their competency. 
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Where to from here 
As was stated in the literature review my study is intended to address the absence of 
scholarship and analysis regarding comparison between partisan and non-partisan elected 
judiciaries. Furthermore, my hope was through this ontological study and quantitative analysis I 
may be able to provide a more informed debate on possible further reforms to the current 
practices of judicial selection. Given the results of my study; that of the more consistent data and 
smaller standard deviations produced from the selected Michigan counties, I am inclined to 
suggest that non-partisan judicial elections are superior to partisan judicial elections. The higher 
imprisonment rates of the selected Illinois counties, if looked at by a case-by-case basis may be 
fair and just. The overall trend however towards higher sentences by partisan elected judiciaries 
over non-partisan elected judiciaries (in this study, rates of imprisonments in Illinois over 
Michigan) is concerning and certainly raises questions of the levels to which the judiciary is 
independent. As discussed in my theoretical framework; when a judicial candidate is selected by 
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a party primary process and then elected with a partisan label in a general election, rather than an 
independent judiciary one has a judiciary that is interdependent with their party. This judiciary 
requires party support to be elected and the party requires a judge to be “tough on crime” in 
order to maintain the party position on the middle ground.    
The area of fundraising and campaign donations, which is discussed in the theory section, 
has not been included in my data collection and results. The reason for this is that it would 
require a separate quantitative analysis into campaign donations and fundraising for individual 
judicial officers and their subsequent sentencing practices. The results of my study allow for 
questions to be raised into the independence and integrity of a partisan elected judiciary. A 
follow up to the question of independence would be the aforementioned analysis of campaign 
donations and fundraising practices. This would then better allow me to provide more detailed 
reform suggestions into the current practices of judicial elections.   
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Chapter 4: Looking Forward 
Limitations 
Following on from the discussion section I shall now discuss the limitations of my study, 
scrutinize the methodology used and how it may limit inference of my results, suggest methods 
for further improvement and finally examine how the results gathered have highlighted areas of 
this field that require further research. 
Research Design 
The use of general circuit and trial court data such as conviction rates and imprisonment 
rates allow for the results of my quantitative study to be generalized to other counties of similar 
demographics. However an in depth series of case studies in the respective states would give a 
more detailed account of the extent to which severe sentencing discrepancies occur between the 
two states and whether they are caused by extenuating circumstances not accounted for in this 
study. The methodology used in this quantitative analysis does not take into account if 
extenuating circumstances have caused significant differences in imprisonment rates. In defence 
of the methodology used, the amount of data should compensate for any mitigating 
circumstances for severity of sentence. Further to this although a series of case studies may be 
able to give a more detailed explanation into sentencing discrepancies, it would only be case 
specific and would be harder to generalise, thus not giving a general overview. In order to draw 
more specific conclusions future research in the area of sentencing discrepancy between partisan 
and non-partisan judiciaries should look at specific crimes, e.g. drug possession, burglary, etc. 
By looking at one particular crime one can more accurately analyse and map sentencing 
differences.  
As stated in the previous discussion section the data I have collected was only from 10 
counties in each state and not from the whole state and although a significant difference was 
found between the states the strength of the inference of the results should not be overstated. The 
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method of choosing counties tried to ensure a fair cross-section of the respective states was 
accounted for in the data. However as it was a selection of counties and not all counties it would 
not be accurate to infer that the results show that Illinois has significantly higher sentencing than 
Michigan. The results returned certainly favour my hypothesis and theory however a state wide 
analysis is required before one can categorically claim that the null hypothesis can be ruled out.    
Possible External Causal Factors 
The results from the Illinois counties with over 10% black population when compared to 
the total state data showed the possible effect of this racial causal factor. However as the 
Michigan counties with 10% or greater black population were not significantly different to the 
total state data and Illinois and Michigan have similar total black populations the data did not 
affect my findings in this study. However it certainly raises questions in regards to a possible 
affect of party affiliation and racial inclusion, or exclusion. Furthermore only three counties out 
of the selected Illinois counties had 10% or greater black population and one should not deduce 
more meaning from these results than what is present. They do however prompt further research 
in this area.    
Possible Partisan Difference 
The data and results collected from the Republican and Democrat which produced no 
significant difference, favours my theory for both party’s battle for the middle ground. However 
the results as stated did show a trend towards higher conviction and imprisonment in favour of 
the Republican dominated judiciaries. A greater sample of Democratic (5 present in my sample) 
and Republican (4 present in my sample) are needed in order to make a more conclusive 
resolution of this issue, either confirming or dispelling my theory. In regards to my theory on the 
effect electoral competition has upon sentencing in Illinois, I only had one county that resided in 
a bipartisan circuit judiciary. The data from this county in relation to the collated state data 
confirmed my theory on competition; that competition in party primaries causes harsher 
sentencing due to a judicial officer’s obligation back to their party for their position in office 
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rather than tougher competition in a general election causing a higher rate of sentencing. 
However this validation is only based on the results of one county and once again more counties 
with a bipartisan judiciary should be looked at before this theory can be generalized. 
Further Research 
The results returned were in favour of my hypothesis, with Illinois having significantly 
higher rates of imprisonment than Michigan, suggesting party affiliation, partisan selection 
process and the Median Voter Theorem effect sentencing in partisan elected judiciaries more so 
than non-partisan elected judiciaries. In order to further test this theory a comparison of a 
partisan elected judiciary, a non-partisan elected judiciary and an appointed judiciary’s 
conviction and imprisonment rates should be done. By comparing the three methods of judicial 
selection one could then better understand the role elections have upon sentencing. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The results of this investigation have suggested that if Lady Justice was elected via partisan 
method her blindfold seems to be removed and, rather than distributing justice dispassionately 
and impartially, she is staring at public opinion and partisan obligations. The judiciary is a 
normative system, prescribing behaviour in society and when these prescriptions seem to vary 
between states one has to question why. Through this study I have tried to illuminate why 
sentencing differences occur between partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries, and why 
higher or harsher sentences are more likely to occur in partisan elected judiciaries.  
Positioning the Research 
It is my hope that this study has attended to the gap present in current judicial selection 
scholarship and sentencing behaviour. By examining and comparing conviction and 
imprisonment rates of partisan and non-partisan elected judiciaries I have been able to raise the 
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question of sentencing disparity between these two selection methods. I have attempted to 
address the causes for such disparity through my own theoretical framework.              
In the literature review I identified the current strands of scholarship, partisan effect, 
election year effect and the general debate on judicial integrity. By identifying these areas of 
literature I was able to highlight the void currently in judicial scholarship, the lack of analysis 
and comparison of partisan and non-partisan judicial election. Following this I looked at the 
history behind judicial elections and the current situation in regards to debate and reform. The 
current strands of scholarship, particularly the work of Bright and Keenan (1995) and Streb 
(2007) and the current context surrounding judicial elections allowed me to build my theory 
analogous to theirs. Rather than looking at the partisan effect as described in the literature 
review, Democrats vs. Republicans, my primary theory is built upon the effect party affiliation, 
or partisan labelling might have upon judicial behaviour. Firstly I looked at how and why parties 
exist with reference to the work of Aldrich (2011), following from this I used the Median Voter 
Theorem in order to explain why it was beneficial to a judicial officer to be perceived as tough 
on crime. This convergence to the median, e.g. an appearance of being “tough on crime” should 
also be applicable to non-partisan elected judiciaries.  However my argument is that the partisan 
selection process causes a heightening of this effect. Partisan primaries and subsequent party 
donations are why we should see higher rates of sentencing from partisan elected judiciaries. A 
judicial officer is no longer accountable just to their constituents but to their party and their 
donors. Combining Keenan and Bright’s (1995) theory and the Median Voter Theorem that it 
was in the interest of both political parties to be perceived as tough on crime, I further theorized 
that there should not be any within state difference in sentencing due to different parties. This 
theory, by rights, should be applicable to partisan elected judiciaries in other states. 
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Closing Remarks 
By looking at the conviction and imprisonment rates of ten selected counties of Illinois and 
Michigan I was able to tabulate results and create a paradigm in relation to my theory. Overall 
my results showed that Illinois had significantly higher imprisonment rates than Michigan. These 
results along with further testing of external causal factors such as racial demographics and 
geographic area suggest that these significantly higher rates of imprisonment are due to the 
differing methods of judicial selection.  
In the discussion and limitation sections I was able to reflect upon how the results validate 
parts of my theory and highlight weakness in other areas. Further to this I was able to address 
which areas of my study require further review and analysis, those being the significantly higher 
rates of imprisonment in Illinois counties with a black population of10% and greater, and the 
need to include a greater number of counties in future analysis. I also reflect on the need for a 
study to review party and independent campaign donations and subsequent sentencing practice in 
order to sufficiently address the questions in regards to integrity and independence which I raise. 
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Figure 1: Map of Illinois, from http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-59738/Illinois-cities  
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Figure 2: Map of Illinois counties, from http://www.geographic.org/maps/new2/illinois_maps.html  
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Figure 3: Map of Illinois Circuit Courts, from http://19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/Organization/Pages/il_crts.aspx  
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Figure 4: Map of Michigan, from http://www.presentationmall.com/shop/item.aspx?itemid=859  
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Figure 5: Map of Michigan counties, from http://www.digital-topo-maps.com/county-map/michigan.shtml  
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Figure 6: Map of Michigan Circuit Courts, from 
http://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/other/ct_admin_regions_map.pdf  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Illinois County Demographics 
County Pop. Area 
Median 
Age 
Median 
Annual 
Income $ 
Racial Makeup % 
Educational 
attainment % (ppl 
aged 25+) 
    
Male Female White  Black Hisp. 
Nat. 
Amer. Asian 
Other 
and 
mixed 
High 
School 
Completion 
Bachelor 
Degree 
Cook 5,194,675 Metro. 34 40690 31298 43.7 25 24.4 0.8 6.5 1.8 83.2 33.2 
Dupage 916,924 Metro. 35 60909 41346 69.8 5.1 13.6 0.4 10.4 1.7 92 45.3 
Fulton 36,962 Rural 39 31800 21223 92.4 3.8 2.5 0.6 0.4 0.9 83.6 13.4 
Grundy  50,063 Reg. 36 46392 26487 88.4 1.6 8.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 90.7 18.3 
Jefferson 38,827 Rural 38 34089 21015 87 8.7 2.2 0.3 0.7 1.6 83.7 14.1 
Kendall 114,736 Reg. 34 50268 30415 73.7 6.1 15.9 0.4 3.3 1.7 92 32.3 
Lake  703,462 Metro. 34 50789 33458 64.8 7.4 20.3 0.8 6.6 2 88.8 41.3 
Perry 22,350 Rural 38 29169 20170 86.7 8.8 2.8 0.4 0.4 1.4 81.5 13.5 
Sangamon 198,844 Reg. 37 37696 28814 82.3 12 1.9 0.2 1.7 2.1 91 31 
Will 677,560 Metro. 33 50152 31345 66.8 11.5 15.9 0.4 4.8 1.7 90 30.7 
 
 
Table 2: Michigan County Demographics 
County Pop. Area 
Median 
Age 
Median 
Annual 
Income $ 
Racial Makeup % 
Educational 
attainment % (ppl 
aged 25+) 
    
Male Female White  Black Hisp. 
Nat. 
Amer. Asian 
Other 
and 
mixed 
High 
School 
Completion 
Bachelor 
Degree 
Bay  107,771 Reg. 42 31035 18294 91 1.5 4.7 0.4 0.5 1.7 87.1 18 
Berrien 156,813 Reg. 41 26745 16289 75.9 15.2 4.5 0.5 1.5 2.2 86.6 23.3 
Clinton/ 
Gratiot 117,614 Reg. 37 37411 26699 88.9 3.95 4.75 0.5 0.9 1.4 90 20.35 
Delta 37,069 Rural 46 28702 15093 94 0.3 0.9 2.4 0.4 2.1 90.6 18.7 
Hillsdale 46,688 Rural 36 35349 23718 95.6 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.2 86.6 14.2 
Oakland 1,202,362 Metro. 37 55833 35890 74.6 14.1 3.6 0.3 5.8 2 92.2 42.2 
St Clair 163,040 Metro. 41 30056 16771 92 2.6 2.9 0.5 0.5 1.9 87.8 15 
Tuscola 55,729 Rural 42 28288 15314 94.1 1.3 2.9 0.5 0.3 1.1 84.8 12.4 
Washtenaw 344,791 Metro. 31 49304 33598 71.7 12.9 4.2 0.4 8.3 3.3 93.6 50.8 
Wayne 1,820,584 Metro. 37 26823 17744 49.8 40.3 5.4 0.4 2.7 2.2 83.2 20.2 
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Table 3: County and Circuit Judicial details and Illinois Partisan rating 
Illinois 
      
County 
Circuit #/Region 
#Judges 
per 
Circuit 
# 
Dem 
# 
Rep 
Classification 
# of judges with party 
affiliation unaccounted 
for 
Cook Cook/1st Appellate 166 141 9 Democrat 16 
Dupage 18th/2nd Appellate 14 0 14 Republican   
Fulton 9th/3rd Appellatte * 10 4 6 Bipartisan   
Grundy  13th/3rd Appellate * 8 5 2 Democrat 1 
Jefferson 2nd/5th Appellate * 15 10 5 Democrat   
Kendall 16th/2nd appellate * 19 2 17 Republican   
Lake  19th/2nd Appellate 13 11 2 Democrat   
Perry 20th/5th Appellate * 11 9 1 Democrat 1  
Sangamon 7th/4th Appellate 11 3 8 Republican   
Will 12th/3rd Appellate 16 5 11 Republican   
 
(* includes other counties) 
     Michigan 
      Bay  18th/3rd 3 
    Berrien 2nd/2nd 4 
    Clinton/Gratiot 29th/3rd 2 
    Delta 47th/4th 1 
    Hillsdale 1st/2nd 1 
    Oakland 6th/1st 18 
    St Clair 31st/1st 3 
    Tuscola 54th/3rd 1 
    Washtenaw 22nd/1st 5 
    Wayne 3rd/1st 61 
    
       Party affiliation data obtained from http://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CandidateSearch.aspx   
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Table 4: Illinois and Michigan county case dispositions, convictions and imprisonment numbers and rates 
  Circuit court criminal 
case dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
  % of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
Illinois       
            
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook 35276 34506 29478 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Dupage 4036 3802 3408 2723 67.47 2673 70.31 2272 66.67 922 33.86 992 37.11 727 32.00 
Fulton 257 237 233 158 61.48 147 62.03 118 50.64 54 34.18 54 36.73 49 41.53 
Grundy  243 258 291 160 65.84 185 71.71 193 66.32 59 36.88 65 35.14 57 29.53 
Jefferson 616 877 766 287 46.59 432 49.25 304 39.69 115 40.07 160 37.04 90 29.61 
Kendall 436 408 401 388 88.99 362 88.73 347 86.53 178 45.88 132 36.46 119 34.29 
Lake  5816 5832 5087 2404 41.33 2345 40.21 2118 41.64 779 32.40 867 36.97 698 32.96 
Perry 172 149 133 110 63.95 105 70.47 94 70.68 24 21.82 25 23.81 21 22.34 
Sangamon 1409 1394 1316 635 45.07 714 51.22 567 43.09 383 60.31 401 56.16 275 48.50 
Will 2654 2892 2731 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Average         62.62   65.33   61.46   41.55   40.93   37.39 
Standard deviation       14.94   14.79   16.57   12.31   11.05   10.47 
                
Michigan 
               
Bay  870 864 862 576 66.21 590 68.29 553 64.15 136 23.61 110 18.64 160 28.93 
Berrien 1565 1527 1298 1413 90.29 1351 88.47 1190 91.68 323 22.86 362 26.80 330 27.73 
Clinton/Gratiot 357 381 416 253 70.87 260 68.24 298 71.63 76 30.04 90 34.62 105 35.23 
Delta 194 161 155 117 60.31 99 61.49 109 70.32 22 18.80 13 13.13 17 15.60 
Hillsdale 171 149 139 116 67.84 109 73.15 115 82.73 58 50.00 51 46.79 63 54.78 
Oakland 6443 6048 5356 5055 78.46 4613 76.27 4294 80.17 1171 23.17 1045 22.65 953 22.19 
St Clair 1071 973 1038 901 84.13 819 84.17 812 78.23 169 18.76 132 16.12 144 17.73 
Tuscola 441 438 420 291 65.99 310 70.78 291 69.29 65 22.34 86 27.74 93 31.96 
Washtenaw 2980 2205 2185 1164 39.06 966 43.81 996 45.58 312 26.80 273 28.26 239 24.00 
Wayne 18514 16793 15860 13283 71.75 12101 72.06 10882 68.61 2778 20.91 2596 21.45 2442 22.44 
Average         69.49   70.67   72.24   25.73   25.62   28.06 
Standard deviation       14.03   12.27   12.42   9.19   9.79   11.18 
                
P-Value  
    
0.15 
 
0.20 
 
0.06 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
(Illinois data vs Michigan data) 
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Table 5: Illinois counties with a Black pop. of 10% or greater conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates  
 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Sangamon 635 45.07 714 51.22 567 43.09 383 60.31 401 56.16 275 48.50 
Will 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Average   63.51   66.86   64.15   56.80   55.33   50.54 
Standard deviation 16.79   14.52   18.74   4.35   5.80   4.70 
             
P-Value  
 
0.47 
 
0.44 
 
0.42 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
(10% or greater Black pop. vs Illinois data set) 
        
Table 6: Michigan counties with a Black pop. of 10% or greater conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Berrien 1413 90.29 1351 88.47 1190 91.68 323 22.86 362 26.80 330 27.73 
Oakland 5055 78.46 4613 76.27 4294 80.17 1171 23.17 1045 22.65 953 22.19 
Washtenaw 1164 39.06 966 43.81 996 45.58 312 26.80 273 28.26 239 24.00 
Wayne 13283 71.75 12101 72.06 10882 68.61 2778 20.91 2596 21.45 2442 22.44 
Average   69.89   70.15   71.51   23.44   24.79   24.09 
Standard deviation 21.94   18.89   19.69   2.46   3.26   2.56 
             
P-value 
 
0.49 
 
0.48 
 
0.47 
 
0.24 
 
0.41 
 
0.16 
(10% or greater Black pop. vs Michigan data set) 
        
Table 7: Illinois counties with a White pop. of 80% or less conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Dupage 2723 67.47 2673 70.31 2272 66.67 922 33.86 992 37.11 727 32.00 
Kendall 388 88.99 362 88.73 347 86.53 178 45.88 132 36.46 119 34.29 
Lake  2404 41.33 2345 40.21 2118 41.64 779 32.40 867 36.97 698 32.96 
Will 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Average   68.65   69.72   68.84   44.45   44.07   40.47 
Standard deviation 17.67   18.28   17.05   11.22   10.70   10.61 
             
P-value 
 
0.27 
 
0.33 
 
0.22 
 
0.33 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
(80% or less White pop. vs Illinois data set) 
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Table 8: Illinois Democratic and Republican county conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
  
Convictions  Imprisonments 
  
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County Party 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook Dem 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Grundy  Dem 160 65.84 185 71.71 193 66.32 59 36.88 65 35.14 57 29.53 
Jefferson Dem 287 46.59 432 49.26 304 39.69 115 40.07 160 37.04 90 29.61 
Lake  Dem 2404 41.33 2345 40.21 2118 41.64 779 32.40 867 36.97 698 32.96 
Perry Dem 110 63.95 105 70.47 94 70.68 24 21.82 25 23.81 21 22.34 
Average     57.05   60.22   57.74   37.87   38.73   34.07 
Standard deviation   12.16   14.52   15.70   13.28   13.44   12.81 
              
Dupage Rep 2723 67.47 2673 70.31 2272 66.67 922 33.86 992 37.11 727 32.00 
Kendall Rep 388 88.99 362 88.73 347 86.53 178 45.88 132 36.46 119 34.29 
Sangamon Rep 635 45.07 714 51.22 567 43.09 383 60.31 401 56.16 275 48.50 
Will Rep 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Average     69.86   72.54   68.82   48.00   44.72   40.50 
Standard deviation   16.21   16.08   19.00   11.13   9.60   8.56 
              
P-value  
  
0.15 
 
0.14 
 
0.19 
 
0.13 
 
0.23 
 
0.20 
(Democratic counties vs. Republican counties) 
          
Table 9: Bipartisan county conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Fulton 158 61.48 147 62.03 118 50.64 54 34.18 54 36.73 49 41.53 
State Average   62.62   65.33   61.46   41.55   40.93   37.39 
State Standard 
deviation   14.94   14.79   16.57   12.31   11.05   10.47 
Difference   1.14   3.30   10.82   7.37   4.20   4.14 
 
Table 10: Metropolitan Illinois county case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case 
dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook 35276 34506 #### 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Dupage 4036 3802 3408 2723 67.47 2673 70.31 2272 66.67 922 33.86 992 37.11 727 32.00 
Lake  5816 5832 5087 2404 41.33 2345 40.21 2118 41.64 779 32.40 867 36.97 698 32.96 
Will 2654 2892 2731 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Average       63.56   64.97   64.42   44.09   45.98   42.02 
Standard 
deviation       15.61   17.17   16.04   12.92   11.34   11.58 
                P-
value 
    
0.46 
 
0.49 
 
0.38 
 
0.37 
 
0.24 
 
0.26 
(Illinois metropolitan data vs. Total Illinois data) 
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Table 11: Metropolitan Michigan county case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Oakland 6443 6048 5356 5055 78.46 4613 76.27 4294 80.17 1171 23.17 1045 22.65 953 22.19 
St Clair 1071 973 1038 901 84.13 819 84.17 812 78.23 169 18.76 132 16.12 144 17.73 
Washtenaw 2980 2205 2185 1164 39.06 966 43.81 996 45.58 312 26.80 273 28.26 239 24.00 
Wayne 18514 16793 15860 13283 71.75 12101 72.06 10882 68.61 2778 20.91 2596 21.45 2442 22.44 
Average       68.35   69.08   68.15   22.41   22.12   21.59 
Standard deviation     20.17   17.58   15.87   3.44   4.98   2.70 
                
P-value 
   
0.46 
 
0.44 
 
0.33 
 
0.17 
 
0.20 
 
0.06 
(Michigan metropolitan data vs. Total Michigan data) 
         
Table 12: Regional Illinois county case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case 
dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Grundy  243 258 291 160 65.84 185 71.71 193 66.32 59 36.88 65 35.14 57 29.53 
Kendall 436 408 401 388 88.99 362 88.73 347 86.53 178 45.88 132 36.46 119 34.29 
Sangamon 1409 1394 1316 635 45.07 714 51.22 567 43.09 383 60.31 401 56.16 275 48.50 
Average       66.63   70.55   65.31   47.69   42.59   37.44 
Standard deviation     21.97   18.78   21.74   11.82   11.77   9.87 
                
P-value 
   
0.39 
 
0.35 
 
0.40 
 
0.24 
 
0.42 
 
0.50 
(Illinois regional data vs. Total Illinois data) 
           
Table 13: Regional Michigan county case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case 
dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Bay  870 864 862 576 66.21 590 68.29 553 64.15 136 23.61 110 18.64 160 28.93 
Berrien 1565 1527 1298 1413 90.29 1351 88.47 1190 91.68 323 22.86 362 26.80 330 27.73 
Clinton/ 
Gratiot 357 381 416 253 70.87 260 68.24 298 71.63 76 30.04 90 34.62 105 35.23 
Average         75.79   75.00   75.82   25.50   26.69   30.63 
Standard deviation     12.77   11.67   14.24   3.95   7.99   4.03 
                
P-value 
    
0.25 
 
0.31 
 
0.36 
 
0.48 
 
0.43 
 
0.28 
(Michigan regional data vs. Total Michigan data) 
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Table 14: Rural Illinois case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case 
dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Fulton 257 237 233 158 61.48 147 62.03 118 50.64 54 34.18 54 36.73 49 41.53 
Jefferson 616 877 766 287 46.59 432 49.26 304 39.69 115 40.07 160 37.04 90 29.61 
Perry 172 149 133 110 63.95 105 70.47 94 70.68 24 21.82 25 23.81 21 22.34 
Average         57.34   60.59   53.67   32.02   32.53   31.16 
Standard deviation     9.39   10.68   15.72   9.31   7.55   9.69 
                
P-value 
    
0.25 
 
0.28 
 
0.25 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 
0.20 
(Illinois rural data vs. Total Illinois data) 
           
Table 15: Rural Michigan county case dispositions, conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
Circuit court criminal case 
dispositions 
Convictions  Imprisonments 
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County 2008 2009 2010 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Delta 194 161 155 117 60.31 99 61.49 109 70.32 22 18.80 13 13.13 17 15.60 
Hillsdale 171 149 139 116 67.84 109 73.15 115 82.73 58 50.00 51 46.79 63 54.78 
Tuscola 441 438 420 291 65.99 310 70.78 291 69.29 65 22.34 86 27.74 93 31.96 
Average         64.71   68.47   74.11   30.38   29.22   34.11 
Standard deviation     3.92   6.16   7.48   17.08   16.88   19.68 
                
P-value 
    
0.18 
 
0.34 
 
0.38 
 
0.34 
 
0.38 
 
0.33 
(Michigan rural data vs. Total Michigan data) 
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Table 16: Comparison of Illinois and Michigan 'similar' counties conviction and imprisonment numbers and rates 
  
Convictions  Imprisonments 
  
% of Cases Convicted % of Convictions Imprisoned 
County State 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
Cook Illinois 23821 67.53 23967 69.46 20748 70.39 13854 58.16 14541 60.67 11602 55.92 
Wayne Michigan 13283 71.75 12101 72.06 10882 68.61 2778 20.91 2596 21.45 2442 22.44 
Difference     4.22   2.60   1.78   37.25   39.22   33.48 
Lake  Illinois 2404 41.33 2345 40.21 2118 41.64 779 32.40 867 36.97 698 32.96 
Washtenaw Michigan 1164 39.06 966 43.81 996 45.58 312 26.80 273 28.26 239 24.00 
Difference     2.27   3.36   3.94   5.60   8.71   8.96 
Dupage Illinois 2723 67.47 2673 70.31 2272 66.67 922 33.86 992 37.11 727 32.00 
Oakland Michigan 5055 78.46 4613 76.27 4294 80.17 1171 23.17 1045 22.65 953 22.19 
Difference     10.99   5.96   13.50   10.69   14.46   9.81 
Sangamon Illinois 635 45.07 714 51.22 567 43.09 383 60.31 401 56.16 275 48.50 
Berrien Michigan 1413 90.29 1351 88.47 1190 91.68 323 22.86 362 26.80 330 27.73 
Difference     45.22   37.25   48.59   37.45   29.36   20.77 
Perry Illinois 110 63.95 105 70.47 94 70.68 24 21.82 25 23.81 21 22.34 
Delta Michigan 117 60.31 99 61.49 109 70.32 22 18.80 13 13.13 17 15.60 
Difference     3.64   8.98   0.36   3.02   10.68   6.74 
Jefferson Illinois 287 46.59 432 49.26 304 39.69 115 40.07 160 37.04 90 29.61 
Tuscola Michigan 291 65.99 310 70.78 291 69.29 65 22.34 86 27.74 93 31.96 
Difference     19.40   21.52   29.60   17.73   9.30   2.35 
Fulton Illinois 158 61.48 147 62.03 118 50.64 54 34.18 54 36.73 49 41.53 
Hillsdale Michigan 116 67.84 109 73.15 115 82.73 58 50.00 51 46.79 63 54.78 
Difference     6.36   11.12   32.09   15.82   10.06   13.25 
Kendall Illinois 388 88.99 362 88.73 347 86.53 178 45.88 132 36.46 119 34.29 
Clinton/Gratiot Michigan 253 70.87 260 68.24 298 71.63 76 30.04 90 34.62 105 35.23 
Difference     18.12   20.49   14.90   15.84   1.84   0.94 
Will Illinois 2068 77.92 2311 79.91 2157 78.98 1074 51.93 1136 49.16 1018 47.20 
Bay  Michigan 576 66.21 590 68.29 553 64.15 136 23.61 110 18.64 160 28.93 
Difference     11.71   11.62   14.83   28.32   30.52   18.27 
Grundy  Illinois 160 65.84 185 71.71 193 66.32 59 36.88 65 35.14 57 29.53 
St Clair Michigan 901 84.13 819 84.17 812 78.23 169 18.76 132 16.12 144 17.73 
Difference     18.29   12.46   11.91   18.12   19.02   11.80 
 
 
 
 
 
